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This project describes the Systems Engineering (SE) effort by Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) Cohort Team 
A
2
.  The team’s objective is to provide SE rigor to validate that variation of the sensor 
data path at the Operational Level of War (OLW) represents a ―game changing‖ concept.  
The team’s hypothesis is that this concept would improve Fleet Battle Management in the 
Maritime Operations Center (MOC).  Specifically, the team explored the Naval Planning 
Process (NPP) and the sensor data path for notional Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). 
Team A
2
 consists of SPAWAR Headquarters and SPAWAR Systems Center 
Pacific employees within the NPS Master of Science in Systems Engineering Cohort 311-
092W.  The team first addressed the topic of Fleet Battle Management with a major 
stakeholder, Dr. Bill Rix, who is the National Competency Lead within SPAWAR for 
SE.  Dr. Rix supports the Chief of Naval Operations Staff in analyzing ―game changing‖ 
concepts to affect appropriate capabilities for the Fleet. 
Team A
2
 tailored a systems engineering process to analyze a non-material 
solution within the objective.  This tailored process analyzed the potential benefits 
obtained by introducing time-sensitive sensor data from UASs in support of the NPP.  
Team A
2
 used Vitech’s CORE Model Based Systems Engineering tool to model and 
simulate the baseline and hypothesized information process using two mission threads.  
These threads were Counter-Piracy and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief. 
Currently, Operational Commanders do not use UAS directly at the OLW due to a 
perception that the UAS is a tactical support asset.  Considerations for use of time-







 dissemination  
 data strategy 
These factors determine whether the information is timely enough to support the 
Operational Commander’s decision cycle. 
 xiv 
The problem statement and model were continually refined as additional research 
demonstrated changes beneficial to the end goal.  Assumptions also required dynamic 
review for continued relevancy and validity.  Throughout, the team reworked initial 
constructs of functionality and their associated models for simplification and 
effectiveness.  A notable example is the representation of external sensor and Blue Forces 
nodes.  Although initially separated to reflect actual infrastructure, the team found that 
processes involving external sensor and Blue Force nodes were not significantly 
different.  Thus, the team used a single node (Blue Forces) in the model for simulation of 
their data flows.  This single node provided a streamlined mechanism for simulation 
while preserving the analysis of differing paths. 
The initial problem statement that UAS is as a game changing addition to the 
OLW was re-scoped to focus on the sensor data flow to the NPP within the MOC and 
Maritime Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) components during time critical 
operations.  The team collected statistics of Information Requests Fulfilled throughout the 
analysis to measure the effectiveness of the UAS sensor data path, planning time, total 
execution time, and determine how path variation would affect the planning process. 
The results conclude that there is no statistically significant difference in planning 
or execution time with the UAS sensor data under the Operational Control of the MOC.  
The team validated this result based on interviews with stakeholders and research on the 
time critical planning.  Planners are allocated a specified time for planning, and then 
―work backwards.‖  The CORE model of the system demonstrated this, and the 
simulation results validated that planning will usually take the allocated time to complete. 
An observed improvement in the planning process was in the MIOC’s ability to 
fulfill information requests.  In the modeled mission threads, the MIOC operation 
improved the mean of the information requests fulfilled to 48.5% over the baseline case 
of 41.7%. 
In the baseline architecture, there is a risk that the Blue Forces might not interpret 
the tasking properly or may exploit the raw data only to meet their own needs.  An 
additional risk is that exploited data sent to the MIOC may not truly meet the operational 
need.  If the MIOC has direct control of the UAS and the exploitation process, the 
exploited Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data should be of better 
 xv 
quality; in line with what the planning team requested; and potentially produced in a 
timely fashion.  
Team A
2
 recommends UAS sensor data be managed and processed either directly 
in the MOC or by Blue Forces.  Since there appears to be only a subtle difference 
between the two, current doctrine and process should support either variant.  
Commanders responsible for the planning and execution should determine if a UAS 
would be helpful in their decision-making.  However, t-tests performed on the data show 
a very high probability the commander and planning team will see some improvement in 
the MIOC’s ability to fulfill information requests. 
Based on the team’s research and analysis of the results, several areas should be 
researched in the future.  These areas follow: 
 Perform network analysis to determine the infrastructure required to support raw 
data feeds. 
 Conduct further operational analysis with a UAS under MOC and MIOC control. 
 Conduct qualitative analysis of MOC operations during time critical planning 
with and without the UAS. 
 Conduct qualitative analysis of the quality of plans received by Blue Forces. 
 Perform operational analysis of Blue Forces executing plans developed with and 
without a UAS in the MOC. 
 Determine where physical control of UAS should reside, Blue Forces or MOC. 
 Identify requirements for a UAS to support operational planning and determine if 
any existing UAS can fulfill these requirements. 






























The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Information Dominance (ID) Vision (Chief 
of Naval Operations 2009) paves the road towards establishing ―game changing‖ Naval 
transformational technologies and capabilities.  The Vision is to ensure information 
dominance over adversaries and provide decision superiority for commanders, 
operational forces and the nation.  That Vision translates to a set of concepts defined by a 
series of Roadmaps tied to CNO’s strategies and architectures.  These Roadmaps guide 
the Navy’s budget and acquisition strategies of information capabilities over the next ten 
to fifteen years.  This Capstone project, when initiated, looked at a specific area of one of 
the fifteen roadmaps, Fleet Battle Management (FBM).  The Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (SPAWAR) Cohort Team A
2
 applied a Systems Engineering (SE) 
disciplined approach to analyze if game changing technologies could improve Maritime 
Operations Center (MOC) processes at the Operational Level of War (OLW). 
This section contains the team’s composition and the early plan.  It also contains 
the initial problem statement as understood by the team during the initial exchanges with 
the key stakeholder from SPAWAR 5.1, Dr. Bill Rix.  Further, this section presents 
background information regarding the Navy’s ID Vision, MOC, OLW, and Unmanned 
Systems (UxS) as a proposed ―game changer‖ towards ID and Decision Superiority (DS). 
Section 2, Problem Refinement and Needs Analysis, describes the team’s effort to 
work with the stakeholders in refining the problem statement to a manageable and 
realistic scope.  In addition, this section provides the high level Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) for the refined problem statement. 
Section 3, Analysis and Allocation, then maps the details of the project SE 
process to the CONOPS and associated nodes.  Section 4, Modeling and Simulation, 
describes the modeling and simulation effort.  These sections form the majority of the 
research, and illustrate how the methodology supported the hypothesis. 
Finally, Section 5, Conclusions and Recommendations, contains conclusions 
based on statistical analysis, and recommendations for the project and future work.  
 2 
1.1 Initial Problem Statement  
The hypothesis that FBM technologies, tactics, processes and procedures may 
benefit from the incorporation of some of the ―game changing‖ transformational 
technologies articulated in the CNO ID vision has not been evaluated with SE rigor.  
Proper evaluation requires 
 definition of Measures of Performance (MOP) and Technical Performance 
Measurement (TPM) associated with FBM success; 
 identification of gaps or shortfalls in current and programmed approaches; 
 development of sufficiently detailed architectural alternatives; 
 construction of performance models; 
 performance of high-level analyses and optimization of candidate solutions for 
both capability and Total Ownership Cost (TOC). 
The team continually refined the initial problem statement as shown in Section 2.  
The refined problem statement is contained in Section 2.3. 
1.2 Background 
This section establishes the foundation for the Capstone project.  First is a 
discussion of the CNO’s Vision for ID.  Part of that Vision is to leverage ―game 
changing‖ technologies to influence capability investments and maintain decision 
superiority.  Second, the team discusses Unmanned Systems (UxSs) as the technology 
chosen for this project.  The section ends with discussion of warfighting environments 
and decision superiority issues. 
1.2.1 CNO’s Information Dominance Strategic Roadmap  
CNO Staff (OPNAV) N2/N6 (ID) has initiated an ID Strategic Roadmap for 
investment decisions with input from fifteen Portfolio Roadmaps, as displayed in Figure 
1.  One of these Portfolio Roadmaps was FBM when the project began, but recent 
changes have incorporated the FBM Portfolio into other Portfolios (predominantly DS) 
leaving only fourteen Portfolios at the time of submittal.  Regardless, the team followed 
the functionality of FBM through the MOC throughout this project. 
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The DS strategic roadmap may assist in the Joint Capabilities Integrated 
Development System (JCIDS) process for the Navy as the strategy roadmap leverages all 
the steps contained in the JCIDS process.  A Capabilities Based Assessment for each 
portfolio could ensure the investment strategy is addressing the needed enhancements to 
each portfolio. 
 
Figure 1. Information Dominance Strategic Roadmap 
As shown Figure 1, the CNO expects concurrent supporting concepts, supporting 
strategies, and supporting architectures to combine into the integrated information 
architecture, and an integrated roadmap, that will move the Navy from current platform-
driven decisions to capability-driven decisions for investment.  Many of these capabilities 
yet have to be defined – FBM was one of them.  Consequently, Team A2 Capstone efforts 
focused on quantifying and characterizing this particular portfolio as it applies to the 
OLW at a MOC. 
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Figure 2. OPNAV N2/N6 portfolio development  
SPAWAR, Code 5.1.1 (Modeling Simulation and Analysis) provides co-leads 
with OPNAV N2/N6 in development of each portfolio in Figure 2.  Team A
2
 members 
are also working closely with the SPAWAR lead for FBM and now DS.  This 
collaboration ensured that team efforts aligned with and influenced the portfolio through 
subsequent research results.  Though the FBM Portfolio ceased to exist, the close 
collaboration has continued, thus the project reflects the changing Vision for Naval ID.  
Importantly, Team A
2
 focused the Capstone project toward game changing technologies. 
1.2.2 Unmanned Systems (UxS) 
A key to the Capstone project was UxS.  Team A
2
 chose UxS for the game 
changing concept, and further chose Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) as representative 
of the technology of this concept to scope the efforts of the project.  The game changing 
concept of UxS fills gaps in capability due to the cost effectiveness of this technology as 
well as the flexibility to meet dynamic changes in the battlespace requiring differing 
sensor mixes and rapid deployment over manned systems.  Persistent collection for 
targeting is a key Navy capability shortfall, so Navy will invest in long endurance UxS 
assets to provide persistent collection on high priority targets. 
To narrow the scope of alternatives for an effective project, Team A
2
 chose UAS 
as a specific subset of UxS with game changing technology that has played a significant 
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role in the Iraq and Afghanistan operations at the Tactical Level of War (TLW).  UAS 
provide a low risk option in a high threat anti-air environment, and considerable 
enhanced collection in low threat anti-air environments.  The relative speed and direct 
support capability of UAS have been game changing technology for tactical operations.  
As the team continued to research and re-scope the project, the role of UAS 
within the Capstone project became an illustrative example of one distinct class of sensor 
platforms modeled in analysis.  It became clear that the game changing aspect within the 
OLW was not in the platform itself, but instead in the pathways and processing that the 
sensor data encountered as it went from real-time tactical to operational domains. 
1.2.3 Warfighting Discussion and DS  
This section provides a discussion of the warfighting environments that pose 
communications and connectivity challenges.  The principles of network-centricity may 
change forever how the Naval Forces need to operate in the context of the dynamic 
nature of the battlespace.  In the Information Warfare Age, information is treated as a 
weapon that presents new threats to the operational forces. 
The continuing rapid increase (at an exponential rate) in amount of data available 
to the tactical warfighter is causing concern on how to distill the relevant data to be 
delivered in a timely manner to the appropriate decision-maker in a format that allows 
decision superiority over adversaries.  DS hopes to provide this answer as a force 
multiplier for Fleet Operations. 
DS concepts exhibit the CNO Vision and operating concepts.  The Fleet’s 
information environment must support the Operational Commander’s decision making.  
The technology and enabling architectures behind these concepts embody the Naval 
Forces’ future information leadership and innovation. 
The OPNAV Vision for ID 2025 (Dorsett 2010) incorporates the following data 
strategy construct: 
 Strategic and operational Command and Control (C2) of a globally-distributed 
force requires new Information Technology (IT) tools to achieve requisite levels 
of warning, situational awareness, and insight. 
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 Remotely piloted, unattended, and autonomous systems adaptively networked will 
increasingly populate and dominate the operating environment 
 
Figure 3. Hierarchical structure for data strategy 
Figure 3, on a parallel to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs (Cartwood 2010), shows 
dependent levels of maturing and implementing data strategy principles to achieve 
requisite information in support of decision-makers and delivering ID and DS.  At 
present, only the lower two tiers have any significant capability in automated tools; but 
there are significant limitations to provide this for unstructured data. 
The following questions represent some of the expressed concerns of the CNO to 
OPNAV N2/N6 in the development of the roadmaps: 
 How can information transform into a weapon that provides accurate and timely 
decisions, with desired and predictable results, as other weapons?  
 How can current and future sensors and data sources be netted together to provide 
greater effectiveness and utility? 
 What emerging architectures can reduce development and operating costs, while 
improving connectivity? 
 How can training and technology mitigate challenges involved in joint, agency 
and coalition operations?  
FBM was not defined, and the echelon at which it would be employed also was 
under discussion during project research.  The functionality has been placed in the DS 
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Portfolio, but issues related to the OLW still remain.  This project exploration of the 
OLW and implications for the Navy Planning Process (NPP) will be shared with 
stakeholders and may influence the development of relevant OPNAV Portfolios. 
1.3 Team A2 Organization Structure 
The following sub-sections describe the project design team.  The team 
composition is provided with the roles and responsibilities of the members.  This section 
ends with a discussion of stakeholders considered important to the team for this project. 
1.3.1 Team Composition 
Team A
2
 consists of ten members, physically located in San Diego, CA with 
assignments spread throughout the SPAWAR claimancy and in Program Executive 
Offices (PEOs).  The team roles and responsibilities were divided into two categories: 
project management responsibilities, shown in tan, and SE product development 
responsibilities, shown in cyan, with some overlapping responsibilities, in green, as 





 Roles and responsibilities 
Team A
2
 assignments, roles, and responsibilities varied throughout the course of 
the project to address the focus areas and ensure workload balance.  In addition, the roles 
also changed as the assignments shifted between phases of the project.  These phases 
were mainly from project management areas to SE product development.  The team 
typically organized into sub-teams of two to three members.  The main roles and sub-
team assignments are listed in Table 1. 














































Statistical Analysis Lead 
Alternatives Analysis




Test & Evaluation 
Test & Evaluation Lead
Test & Evaluation
Modeling




Programming / Languages 
Lead 
Programming / Languages
Human Systems Integration HSI Lead 
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Table 1. Team A
2
 Assignments 
Member Assignment Secondary Assignment 
All Content Input and Research  
Albrant, Jeremiah Programming / Languages Lead  Modeling  
Librarian 
Buchholz, Ray Research Lead   
Clulow, Brian Lifecycle Analysis Lead Risk Analysis, Modeling 
Held, Raymond Style Editor 
HSI Lead   
Cost Estimation 
Khatra, Amrik Modeling Lead 
Test and Evaluation Lead 
Programming / Languages 
Miller, Todd Risk Manager 
Statistical Analysis Lead 
 
Minor, Ira Team Lead 
CORE Modeling Lead 
Format Editor 
Nguyen, Peter Programming / Languages 
Modeling 
Test and Evaluation 






Renteria, David Scheduler Team Lead 
 
In the early stages of this Capstone project, and as part of In-Progress Review 
One (IPR 1), the team developed a Program Management Plan (PMP) to guide the project 
effort, milestones, and schedules.  Some of the key program management tools used by 
the team were Risk Management and the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS), described in 




 initiated a list of specific stakeholders identified in Table 2, to be 
engaged using e-mail, document review, and personal contact.  Although each had a stake 
in the project, not all responded to solicitations. 
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Table 2. Stakeholders by Category 
Resource Sponsors Acquisition Community User Community 
OPNAV N2/N6 – Information 
Dominance 
PEO C4I – PMW-120, PMW-
150, PMW-160 
Commander, United States 
Fleet Forces 
OPNAV N00X – Capability 
Assessments 
PEO EIS – PMW-210/205 Commander, United States 
Pacific Fleet 
OPNAV N86 – Expeditionary 
Warfare 
PEO IWS – PEO IWS-5 Department of Homeland 
Security – Maritime Domain 
Awareness 
OPNAV N87 – Submarine 
Warfare 
USCG Deep Water PM USCG C4I 
OPNAV N88 – Air Warfare   
 
For the full name of the entries, see Appendix A.  During the research, 
Commander Third Fleet (C3F) and SPAWAR became the dominant stakeholders 
supporting team efforts. 
1.4 Assumptions 
The following assumptions bounded and refined the project scope of research, 
architecture baseline, and baseline M&S configurations.  Table 3 lists project 
assumptions derived from adjustment of the project risk matrix assessment presented at 
IPR 2.  The team adjusted the risk matrix for assumption and risk management. 
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Table 3. Project Assumptions 
Assumption   Basis 
MOC will not perform tactical 
functions related to UAS 
  The doctrine for MOC roles and responsibilities 
are being refined, and each Operational 
Commander has an individual style that 
determines the configuration of the MOC.  From 
research to date, the trend supports the 
assumption that the purpose of the MOC is to 
conduct the OLW and leave the tactical functions 
to the Tactical Commander. 
MOC would exercise Operational 
Control (OPCON), but not Tactical 
Control (TACON), of sensors when 
raw data could be received and 
exploited in real time. 
 Remote control of sensors is a tactical function.  
Although technology exists to provide this 
capability to the MOC, there are significant 
implications for doing so that could be a 
Capstone project in itself.  This project is limited 
to the data path for the collected data that is 
separate from the command and control of 
sensors. 
MOC exploitation of UAS would 
need to shift between direct 
exploitation of sensors and indirect 
exploitation, rather than a specific 
level of exploitation all the time. 
 This differentiates exploitation of the data vs. 
tasking of sensors.  The assumption is that 
exploitation of raw data is beneficial to the MOC 
and using either type of approach renders the 
type of information required for the mission.  This 
addresses validation of the model. 
Determination of the Life Cycle 
Cost Estimate (LCCE) is not 
required. 
  The scope of this project is limited to an analysis 
of the OLW process, and the recommendations 
will form a non-materiel solution alternative. 
 
1.5 Systems Engineering Process 
This section describes the tailored SE process used by the team during the 
Capstone project.  Team A
2
 followed the approved SE Process as documented in the 
PMP and presented in IPR 1.  
Team A
2
 developed a tailored International Council on Systems Engineering 
(INCOSE) process model – State the Problem, Investigate Alternatives, Model the 
System, Integrate, Launch the System, Assess Performance, Re-Evaluation (SIMILAR) –
used for this project, and is shown in Figure 5.  The process was iterative and much of it 
was done in parallel.  An important part of the process was the ―Re-evaluate‖ phase, 
which helped modify the input based on information from the output.  
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Figure 5. Tailored INCOSE SIMILAR process 
1.5.1 Problem Refinement Process Step 
Team A
2
 developed an initial problem statement for the PMP.  When considering 
the scope, the team quickly recognized that the problem statement needed refinement to 
focus the efforts of the project.  After several meetings among team members and 
stakeholders, the team narrowed the scope of the problem statement to validate the UAS 
"game changing" technology that could improve the NPP in the MOC at the OLW for 
FBM.  The team also held brain-storming sessions to identify areas of research and 
analysis.  The output of these sessions helped in refining the problem statement.  Section 
2, Problem Refinement and Needs Analysis, provides more details related to this problem 
refinement process step.  
1.5.2 Value System Design 
The Value System Design began by identifying the major functions the NPP used 
in the MOC at the OLW.  The team decomposed functions into sub-functions down to the 
lowest logical level.  Then, the lowest level sub-functions had objectives assigned.  The 
team further established evaluation measures to describe satisfactory performance to 
those objectives.  The output of the Value System Design was a value hierarchy detailed 
in Section 3, Analysis and Allocation. 
1.5.3 Modeling Alternatives 
The team used the approved value hierarchy as input into the Alternatives 
Generation process.  Working with the stakeholders, the team developed the feasible 
alternative mission threads of "Counter-Piracy (CP)‖ and "Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR)" as the output of the Alternatives Generation step.  
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For a complete description of the two mission threads used for this Capstone project, 
refer to Appendices C and D respectively. 
Using the approved feasible alternatives as an input, the Model Alternatives phase 
began.  The team used Vitech's CORE Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE) tool 
to M&S the "baseline case" and "hypothesized case" information process to determine 
the impact of the UAS sensor data path in the NPP at the MOC.  Section 4 of this 
document provides the approach and results of the M&S that serves as the output of this 
phase. 
1.5.4 Analysis of Alternatives 
The team used an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) process to evaluate and analyze 
the results of the model alternatives.  The team focused on identification, measures of 
effectiveness, concepts of operations, and overall risk, including the sensitivity of each 
alternative to possible changes in key assumptions or variables.  The outcome of the AoA 
step provided a list of benefits and improvements if the UAS were used in supporting the 
OLW for the NPP at the MOC.  
1.5.5 Final Recommendation 
Team A
2
 used the Final Recommendation phase to assemble all earlier input 
leading to a preferred alternative and a cohesive recommendation for possible benefits of 
using time-sensitive UAS data in support of the NPP.  Due to curriculum schedule 


























2 Problem Refinement and Needs Analysis 
The purpose of this first phase of the SE process is to accurately identify and 
refine the problem.  The main elements of this phase are Stakeholder Analysis, Affinity 
Diagram, and Operational Concept Design.  Subsequently, the team used the output of 
these activities to generate requirements.  Of course, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of some definitions relevant to this project to derive the requirements.  
Appendix E presents these definitions in detail. 
2.1 Stakeholder Analysis 
This section consists of three parts.  First, the project identified the original 
stakeholders and then their requirements are discussed.  This section concludes with a 
summary of the research and interviews conducted during the course of the Capstone 
project. 
2.1.1 Stakeholder Identification  
The stakeholders of Table 4 are the key stakeholders that provided significant 
research material and feedback throughout the course of the project. 
Table 4. Stakeholders 
Resource Sponsors Acquisition Community User Community 
OPNAV N2/N6 – Information 
Dominance 
SPAWAR 5.1 Commander Third Fleet  
Commander Fifth Fleet 
2.1.2 Stakeholder Requirements 
Team A
2
 understood a key stakeholder was OPNAV N2/N6 – lead for developing 
and implementing the Navy Vision of ID as a warfare area.  Stakeholder documentation 
shaped the problem statement and helped identify key nodes and activities.  SPAWAR 
5.1 (Enterprise Systems Engineering) has teamed with OPNAV N2/N6 to develop the ID 
Roadmaps and was a second key stakeholder to help focus efforts and provided feedback 
on each iteration of work accomplished by the team.  Within the User Community, 
Commander Third Fleet (C3F) provided direct assistance and facilitated information from 
Commander Fifth Fleet (C5F) as the team developed questions and sought validation of 
efforts. 
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Several team members work with the aforementioned stakeholders in job-related 
areas.  This enhanced the development of requirements and customer-perceived needs.  
Requirements development evolved through e-mail, visits, and review of databases.  
Thus, the team methodically assessed both baseline and hypothesized case aspects of the 
problem statement. 
The most active stakeholder response to the team’s inquiries came from C3F.  
Through their knowledge of other stakeholders, and discussion with C3F staff, the team 
learned that MOCs do not use UAS to support operational needs at the OLW.  These 
operational needs imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactical needs; 
operational needs ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and 
provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic 
objectives.  Operational needs are reflected in behavioral patterns that allow assessment 
at the campaign level.  The perception prevails that UAS support tactical needs, and 
having tactical information provided to the MOC would distract the MOC staff from their 
operational mission.  Tactical needs at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and 
maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve 
combat objectives.  The focus of tactical needs is on target acquisition and tracking.  
Based on this feedback, there is no baseline case requirement related to the problem 
statement.  The team focus was then directed to form a hypothesized case requirement of 
value added capability to support OLW decision-making.  Specific tactical needs were 
evaluated to be too narrow in scope to support thorough understanding of operational 
planning needs. 
The team focused on assessing the potential value of changes in Naval CONOPS 
and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) related to the problem statement.  
Although the stakeholders do not expect for gains from such change, the results of 
analysis may identify potential investments to achieve success in using UAS at the OLW. 
2.1.3 Summary of Results for Interviews and Research 
Team A
2
 researched stakeholder documents to gain initial insight to the problem 
and form questions to be resolved or areas for further research.  The team corresponded 
by electronic mail on the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) and the 
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Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) to many of the stakeholders 
to clarify activities and functions, including operational requirements.  Not all 
stakeholders responded, but those that did provided appropriate focus for the effort and 
verified information presented to the stakeholders by the team.  Additionally, Team A
2
 
conducted interviews with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and gained further insight to 
MOC operations by visiting the C3F MOC.  These research methods allowed the team to 
continuously refine and focus the hypothesis and model used for this project.  Specifics 
of these results are addressed throughout the appropriate sections of this project. 
2.2 Affinity Diagram 
This section describes the general process the team used to narrow the scope of 
the Capstone project.  First, the process the team followed to brainstorm aspects of the 
problem is discussed.  Then the use of affinity techniques to focus the team research is 
presented. 
2.2.1 Process 
To focus the Capstone effort, the team captured important elements as part of the 
SE process in a brain-storming session.  The team identified sixteen areas for research 
and analysis (see Table 5).  Given these areas, the team then identified affinity groups to 




Figure 6. Affinity diagram of problem statement issues 
Note in Figure 6 that the groups on the right are complementary and somewhat 
overlapping; consequently, the groups integrate through dependencies of communications 









 of Comms & 
Networks
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Table 5. Affinity Elements 
Affinity Groups Areas of Research and Analysis 




Half-life as a measure of effectiveness 
OLW Mission Thread (UAS) 
Operational scenario identification 
Commander’s complete battle picture 
Tactical versus operational 
Operational Level of War (OLW) 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 





Feedback of “right” information 
Time-value of data 
Sorting the good data 
Pre-execution data analysis 
2.2.2 Focus 
The Navy Vision for using large numbers of UAS as a game changing technology 
requires assessment of UAS concepts and capabilities for value in support of the OLW. 
Indeed, the Vision also requires assessment of UAS strategies for tasking, collection, 
processing, exploitation, fusion, analysis, and dissemination.  This Capstone project, 
therefore, explored the innovative use of the UAS sensor data path as a ―game changing‖ 
concept.  The focus was placed on the implementation of the NPP at the MOC.  
Although the architectures and models used for the project illustrate the full 
complexity of a MOC and its internal and external relationships, the focus of the effort 
was limited to how UAS affects the elements involved.  The limited time to complete the 
project, and the significant research to address needs of stakeholders, dictated the need to 
focus the effort on a narrow thread to have sufficient breadth of analysis.  Even so, this 
seemingly refined aspect is complex due to the number of possible variations. 
2.3 Refined Problem Statement 
The complexity and variations possible to decompose and model the original 
problem statement required further refinement to achieve a scope possible in the time 
allotted.  This Capstone project specifically focused on the potential benefit of  the UAS 
 20 
subset of UxS technologies to the OLW.  Rising costs of developing and sustaining 
manned aerial systems has resulted in Navy movement to large numbers of UxS.  The 
primary advantage of such systems is the ability to afford greater numbers due to Total 
Ownership Cost (TOC) of unmanned versus manned systems.  The ability to use UxS for 
surveillance, reconnaissance, communications relay, and as a weapons platform is 
attractive.  As a result, UxS could be a cost effective alternative to manned systems.  
Nevertheless, the increased platforms and sensors of UxS present challenges in the 
following ways:  
 volume of data collected in all intelligence disciplines. 
 processing and exploitation to support Mission Threads. 
 storage and dissemination of relevant information. 
The ID use of UxS sensors requires key decisions on tasking, collection, 
processing, exploitation, fusion, analysis, and dissemination with a strong data strategy to 
provide prioritized requirements to obtain required information timely enough to make a 
decision by the Operational Commander.  The Navy Vision for using large numbers of 
UxS is a game changing technology that requires assessment of concepts and capabilities 
in support of the OLW.  This Capstone project examined whether variation in the sensor 
data paths and processing for UAS (a specific subset of UxS) can improve FBM at the 
OLW. 
2.4 Operational Concept Design 
The operational concept design provided the framework for the FBM CONOPS.  
The overarching MOC operational process planning is detailed in Section 3, Analysis and 
Allocation.  Stakeholder and research material formalized the team’s problem statement 
refinement and scope of the mission threads identified for the FBM aspects of the 
Capstone project.  The two mission threads identified were CP and HA/DR.  The selected 
mission threads focused on the operational time aspect of MOC responsiveness to a 
HA/DR or CP operation, and it became clear that the hypothesized architecture model 
would lead to a non-materiel recommendation.  Figure 7 depicts the functional CONOPS 
with operational node view of the FBM environment. 
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Figure 7. Functional concept of operations 
Figure 8 depicts the geospatial CONOPS for the FBM environment for a 
simplified OV-1 view of the scenario.  The team concurrently developed a geospatial and 
a functional CONOPS, due to the nature of the problem in assessing the baseline 
operational process at the MOC. 
For background and clarification of the mission threads selected, various 
stakeholders (e.g. SPAWAR, C3F, OPNAV N/2/N6 codes, etc.) and research material 
assisted in refinement of the CP and HA/DR mission threads.  Implementing the Maritime 
Strategy is an example of an HA/DR document that provides an overview of the U.S. 
Navy HA/DR policy (Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard 
2010).  The Anti-Piracy Planning Chart is an example of a CP document that provides an 
overview of reporting requirements, navigation in piracy high risk areas and 




Figure 8. Geospatial concept of operations 
The above geospatial FBM CONOPS generates the following operational 
functions: 
 receipt and display of secondary imagery or data (post processed and analyzed 
information ready for a decision maker) 
 receipt of imagery or data directly from the UAS (raw data requiring processing 
and exploitation tools as well as the manning with appropriate skill sets) 
 control of the UAS payload (access to the sensors on the UAS to dynamically 
collect as assigned by an analyst – for the MOC, achieved through Blue Force 
physical control of sensors) 
The FBM functional and geospatial CONOPS provide the initial MOC 
operational perspective.  It will be further refined in Section 3, Analysis, and Allocation. 
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2.5 Value Analysis 
This project is primarily an analysis of what-if scenarios to prove or disprove the 
initial hypothesis that variation in the sensor data path may be a ―game changer‖ within 
OLW.  Although the team derived a Value System Design as a component of analysis, 
currently no formal guidance exists that dictates the execution of the scenarios explored 
in this Capstone project.   
From an analysis of the simulation scenario results, there is no clear distinction 
between the baseline scenario and the hypothesized scenario.  Distinctions perhaps may 
be determined only by the implementation of a change in MOC operating policy with 
subsequent cumulative data analysis of MOC performance in the years to follow. 
2.6 Requirements Summary 
This Capstone project does not seek to make a materiel solution recommendation, 
but to provide an analysis of MOC operational scenarios with recommended changes to 
CONOPS and TTPs.  This section describes the methodology of the team requirements 
process, lays out both functional and non-functional requirements derived from 
stakeholder need, then identifies constraints the team used to bound the project. 
2.6.1 Methodology 
NPP implementation in the MOC differs within a standard based on assigned 
missions and changing needs.  Therefore, the team used an iterative approach to 
requirements solicitation and decomposition.  According to Navy Technical Training 
Publication (NTTP) 3-32.1, MOCs use a combination of traditional staff structure (i.e., 
N1, N2, N3, etc.) and task organized work elements called Boards, Bureaus, Centers, 
Cells, and Working Groups (B2C2WG).  These B2C2WGs are created, some permanent 
and others for the duration of the task, to perform the specific functions of the MOC 
(Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2008). 
The team examined selected B2C2WG involved in the specific aspects of the 
problem statement focus.  Existing MOCs do not use UAS to support the OLW based on 
e-mail solicitation and personal interviews.  Joint Force Maritime Component 
Commanders (JFMCCs) generally believe that UAS collects tactical information, and 
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does not want the enormous volume of this information in the MOC to detract the staff 
from concentrating on the OLW decisions in support of the mission. 
Given this, there are no established requirements for the hypothesis of the 
problem statement.  Accordingly, the team established requirements related to the 




 recognized early on that this Capstone project would not address 
materiel solutions and their associated requirements, so this section addresses those 
requirements associated with CONOPS and TTPs.   
Team A
2
 was able to develop notional operational requirements, as shown in 
Table 6, for both the CP and HA/DR mission threads verified by stakeholders to be 
reflective of the OLW.  These operational requirements reflect the stakeholder needs and 
were used to formulate the CCIRs that were then simulated in the model for determining 
the number of CCIRs completed.   Therefore, Team A
2
 performed M&S and operational 
analysis to demonstrate which variant of sensor data path is better in a non-materiel 
solution. 
2.6.3 Constraints 
This section presents a brief discussion of the constraints and focus applied to the 
NPP to facilitate research, modeling and results analysis within the given project 
timeline.  Since the NPP is applied to numerous mission types, each of those missions 
carries specific requirements.  The broad nature of the Navy planning activity results in a 
large system of systems and therefore is a complex and encompassing modeling and 
requirements management task.  This research, modeling, and analysis effort for this 
project was therefore refined to narrow the focus and constrain the requirements.   
This effort focused on modeling the OLW, and was constrained to that level.  The 
team generalized and modeled the tactical operations performed outside of the MOC at 
that level of abstraction.  Summarily, the focus was on those NPP activities that occur 
within the MOC; and each mission performed by the MOC varies in its allotted time for 
planning, Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) and operational 
activities.  This effort was further constrained to specific mission threads.  This allowed a 
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standard characteristic to be applied to the model.  For the purposes of research and 
modeling, this task was confined to the mission threads related to CP and HA/DR.  
Constraining the activity in this respect created a modular body of work within the NPP 


























3 Analysis and Allocation 
The following sub-sections detail how the team researched and developed 
information in the problem statement and mission threads to create a model to test the 
hypothesis.  The section encompasses an operational analysis and allocation, a functional 
analysis and allocation, and finishes with a hypothesized architecture. 
3.1 Operational Analysis 
The operational analysis provides the research required to determine operational 
nodes, activities, and relationships.  As identified during the initial ideation process, the 
key to understanding changes to sensor control and information flow rests with the 
interactions between the MOC, Blue Forces, and sensors.  Thorough research into these 
organizations provided the detail required to model the existing operational architectures 
and then test how changes affect their performance. 
3.1.1 Planning Process 
This section provides the link between the different processes identified for the 
mission threads.  The team used this information to define the operational architecture.  
The main process is the Operations Process.  The Operations Process is the overarching 
process that describes the C2 activities performed during operations as shown in Figure 9.  
This provided to the team an understanding of how changes in information flow into the 
MOC can influence missions.  As described in the Maritime Component Commander 
Guidebook, the Operations Process is used to integrate the numerous other processes, 
activities, and tasks executed during operations of a given mission (Naval War College 
2010, 1-1).  A complete description of the research and analysis of the operations 
process, Navy planning process, and commander’s decision cycle is located in Appendix 
F, Planning Process.  This research and analysis led directly to the modeling and 
simulation.  It should be noted that all of the operational activities can be directly linked 
to the UNTL (Joint Staff 2009) 
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 developed the notional operational requirements shown in Table 6 for 
the M&S effort.  The team then vetted these requirements through the C3F and C5F 
classification review officers and intelligence staffs that were deemed as representative of 
existent operational requirements. 
Table 6. Operational Requirements for M&S 
CP Mission Thread   HA/DR Mission Thread 
Information regarding a successful piracy event 
leading to a vessel being held for ransom. 
 Information regarding development of an 
humanitarian assistance need or a 
significant disaster occurrence. 
Information regarding any piracy attack against 
a U.S. flagged/owned vessel. 
 Information regarding U.S. interests 
related to HA/DR. 
Notification of any unsuccessful piracy attack 
against a non-U.S. flagged/owned vessel. 
 Notification of foreign assistance or non-
governmental organizations response. 
Indication of any pirated vessel underway 
conducting mothership piracy operations. 
 Information on host nation infrastructure 
and status. 
 29 
Indication of links between piracy, transnational 
terrorism, and smuggling of illicit cargo. 
 Information on medical services 
infrastructure and status. 
Information regarding piracy tactics, 
techniques, procedures (TTPs) and seasonal 
patterns of life. 
 Information on utilities infrastructure and 
status. 
Information regarding piracy support structure 
and underlying cause for piratical activities. 
 Information on potable water supplies. 
Indication of tribal, clan, and/or warlord ties to 
piracy. 
 Indication of criminal activity related to the 
event. 
Information on piracy ransom money 
distribution. 
 Information on lines of communication 
infrastructure and status. 
Indication of threats to U.S. ships and/or crews 
of piracy related activities. 
 Indication of threats to U.S. persons by 
related activities. 
Information on piracy strongholds or safe 
harbors. 
 Information on health threats or condition. 
Information on piracy internal and external 
organizational command and control 
infrastructure. 
 Information on blood supplies and labs. 
Information on state sponsored piracy 
activities. 
  Information on host nation ability to 
maintain order 
3.1.3 Operational Allocation 
Knowledge of the operations process, NPP, CONOPS, and mission threads 
allowed identification of the operational nodes, activities, and information flows used to 
model the architecture.  The team performed allocation and analysis using Vitech’s 
CORE 6.0 software for MBSE.  CORE 6.0 provided the ability to model both operational 
and system architectures based on the Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
(DoDAF) Version 1.5(Department of Defense 2007).  The Vitech CORE implementation 
of the DoDAF v1.5 schema is shown in Figure 10 (Vitech 2009, vii).  A complete 





Figure 10. CORE’s DoDAF v1.5 schema  
3.1.4 Operational mapping  
All of the operational nodes listed in Appendix G have at least one activity 
defined from the mission threads.  The interaction of the nodes is slightly different for the 
two mission threads.  The differences mainly rest with the preplanning performed by the 
Blue Forces.  The core of the model affected by changes to the sensor tasking and 
information flow is identical for each mission thread.  For this reason, the CP mission 
thread is described in detail, and only the differences are described for the HA/DR thread.  
A complete listing of the parameters of the model is contained in Appendix H. 
To refine the modeling and analysis effort, the mission threads of CP and HA/DR 
were developed.  Additionally, the team defined the major operational activities for each.  




Figure 11. Top-level breakdown of CP operational activities 
The IDEF0 for the baseline CP mission thread is shown in Figure 12.  The top 
level activity is labeled Respond to Piracy Event. 
  
Figure 12. CP mission IDEF0 
Changes to sensor tasking and communication path directly affect the activities 
and interaction between the MOC and the Blue Forces.  The Perform MOC Mission 




































Perform MIOC Mission.  In the model, as illustrated by Figure 13, the Perform Navy 
Planning Process activity is decomposed based on the research presented in Appendix F, 
Planning Process. 
 
Figure 13. Perform NPP FFBD 
CCIRS are generated by the planning team during the NPP in the Mission 
Analysis step as shown in Figure 14.  A sub-activity in Analyze Mission activity was 
created to generate a random number of CCIRS based on a normal distribution each time 
the mission was executed in the CORE simulator (CORESim).  
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Figure 14. Analyze mission IDEF0 
The information requests generated during Mission Analysis are sent to the MIOC 
to be processed and fulfilled.  The IDEF0 for the Perform MIOC Mission is shown in 
Figure 15.  The MIOC processes the CCIRs, determines how to fulfill the requests, and 
generates an external collection request if necessary.  Once the information is obtained, 
the MIOC updates the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) 
and provides it to the planning team.    
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Figure 15. Perform MIOC mission FFBD 
If the MIOC determines that information collection is required, it generates an 
information request to send to the Blue Forces.  The Blue Forces contains an operational 
activity to fulfill collection tasks as shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Fulfill collection task IDEF0 
Once the JFMCC approves the mission analysis step of the planning process, the 
MOC generates and sends a Warning Order (WARNORD) to the Blue Forces.  At the 
JFMCC’s final approval of the planning process to transition the plan, an Operations 
Order (OPORD) is generated and sent to the Blue Forces.  At this point, the Blue Forces 
are clear to execute the mission.  This process is captured in the Blue Forces operational 
activity Execute Mission, shown in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17. Execute mission IDEF0 
Several features were added to the CORE model to show the impact on the 
planning process caused by changing the time required by the MIOCs to fulfill 
information requests.  As mentioned previously, the Mission Analysis activity outputs a 
random amount of CCIRs that is input to the Perform MIOC Mission activity.  The 
MIOC is configured to continuously execute and update the IPOE each time a CCIR was 
fulfilled.  The time required to fulfill each CCIR depended on whether the information 
existed in the MOC, existed in an external database, or required a new collection task.   
An iterative loop was inserted into the Perform Navy Planning Process activity 
immediately before the transition step as shown in Figure 18 as an Enhanced Functional 
Flow Block Diagram (EFFBD).  This loop represented the decision by the JFMCC to 
either: approve the plan and send an OPORD to the Blue Forces, or to reject the plan and 
return to the Perform Mission Analysis step.  The model simulates the decision to 
approve the plan by assigning a probability value that is equal to the number of CCIRs 
fulfilled divided by the total number of CCIRs.  An increased number of fulfilled CCIRs 
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provided an increased probability that the plan will be approved.  The derivation of the 
actual probability values for each activity is described in Section 4, Modeling and 
Simulation.  
 
Figure 18. Perform NPP EFFBD 
The model only required slight adjustments to simulate the HA/DR mission 
thread.  Dave Gorman (Gorman 2010) described that Blue Forces typically begin to move 
to the area of an HA/DR crisis immediately.  As they transit to the area, the MOC plans 
the mission.  Once the MOC generates the mission plan, the time required by the Blue 
Forces to execute is decreased since they have performed much of the preplanning and 
transit.  The planning process remains the same. 
3.2 Functional Analysis 
 In this project, an analysis of the MOC missions and the threads that comprise 
them provided the structure for the analysis of functions within the MOC.  The approach 
was to take each mission thread and decompose it into three elements within the MOC, as 
illustrated in Figure 19.  Those elements were staff, task, and suite; representing the 
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people, the activities to be done by those people, and the functions performed by systems 
that people must rely upon in the completion of their missions. 
 
Figure 19. Illustration of mission thread approach to functional analysis 
Following the guidelines of DoDAF Version 1.5(Department of Defense 2007), 
staff elements were defined as operational nodes within the model representing the MOC.  
Task elements were defined as operational activities as defined in the DoDAF structure.  
As discussed above, an analysis of the selected mission threads provided these derived 
operational activities.  Additionally, Team A
2
 reviewed the Standardized Maritime 
Operations Center (MOC) Architecture Recommendation for POM-12 (Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command 2009) operational activities for inclusion in the model. 
This same document contained an extremely comprehensive listing of MOC 
system functions.  In addition, those system functions already were mapped to physical 
components within the architecture recommendation.  For this project, the listing of 
system functions was constrained to those that implemented the selected operational 
activities.  To determine the most current systems required to perform the selected 


















systems list (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2010) with the Program 
Management Warfare (PMW) 790 MOC Integration project systems allocation SME, Mr. 
Mike Ziegler (Ziegler 2010).  The resulting list contained systems that supported the ISR 
functions required to support the modeled mission threads. 
3.2.1 Functional Allocation 
This section discusses the mapping of operational activities to system functions.  
A presentation of the system functions follows that discussion.  
Following the DoDAF guidelines and the CORE DoDAF schema, Team A
2
 
evaluated the list of over one thousand system functions in the MOC architecture.  The 
functions shown in Table 7 are those that were included in the CORE model with detailed 
descriptions.  All functions were associated with an ―implements‖ relationship to the 
Operational Activities in the model.  
 
Table 7. Modeled System Functions 
Functions 
Analyze Operational Situation   ID Organic IMINT Information Production 
Collaboratively Develop Initial 
Alternative Courses of Action 
 ID SIGINT Information Production 
Collaboratively Develop 
Recommended COA 
 Identify Current Platform & Sensor 
Tasking 
Collaboratively Source Preferred COA  Integrate Information on Potential 
Adversary COA 
Collect HUMINT  Intelligence Collection 
Collect IMINT  Intelligence Processing 
Collect MASINT  Issue Warning/ Alert/ Planning Order 
Collect SIGINT  Manage Sensors 
Communicate Beyond Line of sight - 
Radio 
 Operations Planning 
Communicate Beyond Line of sight - 
Satellite 
 Perform Briefing and Presentation 
Services 
Communicate Beyond Line of sight - 
Terrestrial 
 Predict Enemy Intent 
Conduct Collection Plan Development 
Collaboration 
 Predict Sensor or Weapon Performance 
Conduct Mission Analysis Brief 
Collaboration 
 Predict Sensor Performance & Calculate 
Sensor Coverage 
Confirm Asset/ Sensor Availability  Produce Intelligence & Intelligence 
Preparation of the Battlefield Products 
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Determine Availability of Non-JFMCC 
ISR Capabilities 
 Receive Mission Update 
Develop & Provide Initial CDR's Intent 
& Guidance to Subordinate 
Echelons/Staffs 
 Receive Request for Information 
Evaluate Course of Action  Sensor & Sensor Processing Control 
Evaluate Operational Environment  Sensor Control 
Generate and Validate CCIR (PIR, 
FFIR, EEFI) 
 Sensor Operating Parameter's Control 
Generate Mission Analysis  Support Development of Presentations 
Generate Sensor Coverage  Track Requests for Information 
Generate Theater & External ISR 
Sensor Tasking 
 Transmit Data via Link 
ID Intel Product Production  Validate Processed Sensor Data 
ID MULTI-INT Production   Validate Request for Information 
 
3.2.2 Physical Allocation 
This section discusses the allocation of physical system components to system 
functions.  It will conclude with a listing of MOC ISR systems defined in the CORE 
model to implement the project system functions.  
As stated by Ira Minor, Assistant Program Manager for Engineering (APM(E)) 
for the MOC Integration Project(Minor 2010), ISR systems within the MOC are defined 
within a system of systems engineering model.  These systems are not engineered 
together, instead they are brought together to provide overlapping functionality in many 
areas.  Accordingly, the mapping of system to system functions is not a one-to-one 
relationship.  Furthermore, the list of operational activities in the model was greatly 
reduced from the hundreds of operational activities within the MOC architecture 
definition (Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 2009).  This means that there is 
insufficient granularity in the system functions to allocate completely the physical 
components of the systems to functions.  However, the following system components 
were identified and configured within the model to support MOC ISR operations: 
 Remote Sensors 
 Comm Satellites 
 Blue UAV Control 
 GCCS-J/I3 v 4.2 
 GCCS-M v 4.1 
 GCCS-M SCI v. 4.0.1 
 CMMA v1.2 
 DCGS-N Block 1/2 
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 JSIPS-N 
 GALE Lite v.4.5.4 
 MDA Spiral 1 




 Sensor Platform 
 Sensor 
 DCGS-AF 




 Fire Scout 
 ScanEagle 
3.3 Hypothesized Operational Architecture 
Once the existing operational architecture was modeled, the team performed an 
examination to identify the impact of sensor data requests and receipts upon the model.  It 
was noted that when the planning team generates a CCIR, several steps are taken to fulfill 
it that create significant delay.  The number of fulfilled information requests directly 
impacts the commander’s decision to approve the plan.  If a low number of information 
requests have been satisfied, the commander has an increased probability of rejecting the 
plan.  This adds time to the planning process.  A longer planning process results in less 
time for the Blue Forces to process the plan before execution.  If the planning time is 
constrained, the commander may approve the plan with several unfilled information 
requests.  This can decrease the quality of the plan and may lead to a lower chance of 
success for the mission.  The direct relationships between these values are shown in 
Table 8.  
Table 8. Plan Quality and Time 
Value/Measure Plan Quality Increased Time to 
Execute Mission 
% fulfilled information requests X  
Decreased Planning time  X 
 
3.3.1 Alternative Architecture Identification 
The team examined the existing operational architecture to identify where 
changes to sensor tasking, control, and data return could be implemented to affect change 
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to the measures shown in Table 8.  These changes were placed into two categories: 
information requests and data transfers. 
In the existing architecture, the planning team generates information requests 
(CCIRs) and then passes them to the MIOC.  If the MIOC cannot fulfill the information 
request with existing data, they generate an information request for the Blue Forces.  
Interviews with the Third Fleet MIOC and Raymond Held, the Navy and SPAWAR 
Technical Authority and Chief Systems Engineer for Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance/Information Operations (Meteorology and Oceanography, Cyberspace, 
Space), revealed that these information requests were not always given highest priority 
by the Blue Forces  (Held 2010).  The Blue Forces place their priority on the TLW and 
those needs trump operational level information requests.  In addition, the Blue Forces 
can fulfill the information request using any means at their disposal.  This leads to 
potentially long delays and, sometimes, inadequate information.  The identified 
alternative would be to have the MIOC generate a mission order to task a specific 
platform.  This allows the MIOC to control the type of data that is collected and the 
priority of that collection.  The existing and proposed architectures for information 
requests are shown in Table 9. 
Table 9. Information Request Architectures 
Architecture Planning Team MIOC Blue Forces 
Existing Planning team generates 
information request - 
sends to MOC 
MIOC generates 
information request - 
sends to MOC 
Blue Forces generate 
mission order and 
collects data 
Proposed Planning team generates 
information request - 
sends to MOC 
MIOC generates mission 
order and sends to Blue 
Forces 
Blue Forces  collect 
data 
 
Data transfer comprises the second category of potential changes.  In the existing 
architecture, the Blue Forces collect data based on the information requests received from 
the MIOC.  The Blue Forces analyze and process the raw data and then return exploited 
data to the MIOC.  Further interviews with Raymond Held (Held 2010) reveal that this 
exploitation inserts significant delay and can strip information valuable to the MIOC.  
The identified alternative would be to have the Blue Forces send the raw data directly to 
the MIOC.  The MIOC would then perform the processing, exploitation, and analysis.  
The existing and proposed architectures for data transfer are shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Data Transfer Architectures 
  Planning Team MIOC Blue Forces 
Existing Planning Team receives 
analyzed data from MIOC 
MIOC receives exploited data 
from Blue Forces and sends it 
to the Planning Team 
Blue Forces collect and 
analyze data and then 
send it to the MIOC 
Proposed Planning Team receives 
analyzed data from MIOC 
MIOC receives raw data from 
Blue Forces, analyzes it, then 
sends it to the Planning Team 
Blue Forces collect 
data and then send it to 
the MIOC 
 
Combining the identified architectures reveals four combinations that could be 
modeled (see Table 11).  The first option represents the existing architecture used as a 
baseline to evaluate alternatives.  The second option maintains the existing method to 
request information, but provides raw data to the MIOC for processing, exploitation, and 
analysis.  This combination was determined to be invalid since the MIOC could not 
anticipate how the Blue Forces would interpret and fulfill the information request and 
would not know what data to forward (not all data can be pushed).  The third option 
allows the MIOC to task the Blue Forces to collect data with a mission order, but keeps 
the analysis function with the Blue Forces.  This combination was also determined to be 
invalid.  Since the Blue Forces are receiving a mission order, they do not have insight 
into the purpose of the collect and could not identify the important parts of the 
information to send to the MIOC.  The last option changes both the information requests 
and data transfers.  This option was identified as the alternative that would be modeled 
and tested.  
Table 11. Potential Architectures 
# Information Requests Data Transfers Notes 
1 Existing Existing Modeled 
2 Existing Proposed Invalid 
3 Proposed Existing Invalid 
4 Proposed Proposed Modeled 
3.3.2 Alternative Implementation 
To implement the alternative architecture in the model, the Perform MIOC 
Mission activity was changed to issue a task order for a specific platform to the Blue 
Forces.  The raw data from the sensor was added as an input to the MIOC.  The Process 
ISR Data and Exploit ISR Data activities were then removed from the Blue Forces.  The 
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distribution times for all of the activities were adjusted for the new configuration.  The 
changes to the operational architecture were the same for each of the two mission threads. 
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4 Modeling and Simulation 
This section presents the modeling and simulation approaches.  This includes a 
discussion of how the mission threads and scenarios were developed.  Next, the 
simulation results are given, culminating with an analysis of the systems engineering 
solution provided by this project. 
An MBSE approach results in a quantitative and traceable analysis of system 
performance.  The fundamental activities that make up the NPP and the variants 
commensurate with the mission threads selected carefully were decomposed and 
evaluated for their time critical elements.  The Nodes, Functions, and Operational 
Activities discussed in Section 3, Analysis and Allocation, become the building blocks 
for a time-based assessment of the overall process mission thread. 
This section first discusses the approach used in developing the model 
architecture.  It then presents the four scenarios selected for modeling.  Finally, a 
summary of the model output results are discussed. 
4.1 Modeling Approach 
The approach used to model the mission threads and architectures are presented in 
this section.  Vitech CORE 6.0 MBSE software was used to capture the functional 
architecture described in Section 3.  It also enabled time-based simulation of the 
operational activities.  The operational activities involved in the mission threads 
generated a complete model.  Each activity was either decomposed into subordinate 
operational activities or assigned a random distribution based upon research and 
stakeholder interviews.  This enabled the collection of quantitative data for the mission 
thread scenarios for two different architectures: the baseline and hypothesized cases.  The 
CORE model became a time-based representation of the real world NPP within the MOC. 
The following steps were performed for the modeling and simulation of the NPP:  
1. Define and build the operational activities defined for the NPP, including 
modeling the related MOC elements e.g., the MIOC and Blue Forces. 
2. Create functional relationships, using the Input, Control, Output, Mechanism 
(ICOM) preservation guidelines between the activities. 
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3. Import MOC system functions and components. 
4. Assign system functions and components to relevant activities. 
5. Create EFFBD diagrams based on the NPP process cycle.  
6. Validate model sequencing results follow intent. 
7. Allocate nominal times and distributions to each operational activity based on 
available research including the capturing of advanced multi-exit and decision 
logic as Vitech COREscript. 
8. Develop baseline by collecting elapsed process time data for multiple runs.  
Document the baseline.  
9. Modify the architecture to reflect the hypothesized case.  
10. Collect data on the hypothesized case. 
11. Compare and contrast the critical data distributions using statistical methods. 
4.1.1 Discussion of the Baseline and Hypothesized Cases 
In general terms, the model was designed to quantify the impact of creating a 
direct information path from remote, unmanned platform sensors to the MOC.  The 
hypothesized case implemented a direct tasking and information path between the MOC, 
with the hypothesis that remote sensors would improve the NPP by increasing the 
Commander’s situational awareness.  This case is contrasted by the baseline case wherein 
sensor data was captured, post processed and re-submitted by organizations outside of the 
MOC domain. 
The model focused on two mission thread scenarios, CP and HA/DR, 
characterized in a baseline and hypothesized architecture.  Each architecture was 
analyzed under three time variants to simulate the allotted planning time for each mission 
thread scenario.  The selected planning times represent the design of experiments for the 
simulation.  Each time was chosen such that the hypothesized architecture might exhibit 
statistically significant differences from the baseline architecture if it truly has an effect.  
Table 12 represents the modeled12 separate data sets. 
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Table 12. Model Architectures Under Evaluation 
 Model Architectures 6 Hours 12 hours 24 hours 
CP Baseline Architecture DATA SET 1 DATA SET 5 DATA SET 9 
CP Hypothesized Architecture DATA SET 2 DATA SET 6 DATA SET 10 
HA/DR Baseline Architecture DATA SET 3  DATA SET 7 DATA SET 11 
HA/DR Hypothesized Architecture DATA SET 4 DATA SET 8 DATA SET 12 
4.2 Mission Thread Model Summary 
This section first presents a summary of the characteristics of the four model 
architectures.  It then highlights the differentiating characteristics of each architecture, 
and finally discusses the sequence timing diagrams for each. 
The mission threads were modeled as top-level operational activities.  This 
allowed subordinate activities to decompose both mission threads.  In addition, mission 
thread specific events were modeled as activities that trigger the mission to begin.  For 
example, to begin operational planning in the CP mission thread, the ―Perform Piracy‖ 
activity generates a Situation Report (SITREP) output that triggers the operational 
planning elements.  However, in the HA/DR thread, the ―Perform Act of God‖ activity 
generates a SITREP and WARNORD.  The WARNORD triggers the Blue Forces to 
begin building their tasking based off the mission rather than waiting for the OPORD to 
come from the MOC later on.  By modeling the threads in this way, operational activities 
can be shared between multiple mission threads. 
It was important to observe the time variation inherent to some of the NPP 
operational activities.  These time variant characteristics were captured in each step of the 
model to facilitate a Monte Carlo based simulation. 
4.3 Employing the Monte Carlo Method 
This section details how a Monte Carlo simulation was used with the COREsim 
engine.  Monte Carlo performs analysis by building models of possible results by 
substituting a probability distribution for any factor that has inherent uncertainty.  It then 
allows the simulation models to run many times producing quantifiable results that can be 
analyzed and compared; calculates results over and over, each time using a different set 
of random values from the probability functions.  Monte Carlo simulation produces 
distributions of possible outcome values.  By using probability distributions, variables 
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can have different probabilities of different outcomes occurring.  Probability distributions 
are a much more realistic way of describing uncertainty in variables.  Section 4.5 presents 
these probability distribution results for the HA/DR and the CP models. 
4.4 Simulation Parameters 
The simulation model consists of input, architecture, and output for each mission 
thread.  This section presents a discussion of the model input and output variables that 
formed the basis for final model assessment. 
The primary model attributes that control the results of the simulation are the 
nominal time and distribution allocations for the lowest level abstraction operational 
activities.  These operational activities and their assigned nominal time and distributions 
were extracted based on research and stakeholder interviews of each activity.  A 
summary of these parameters is presented in Appendix H, Operational Activities 
Nominal Time and Distribution Allocation.  Because of the significant variations 
available in possible network configurations that require significant resources to model, 
the team chose optimal times associated with the network.  Further research on these 
findings can be done using variations in networking, but the end result most likely would 
be negligible to the effect being modeled here. 
The NPP is time-bound based on the mission thread and other time critical factors 
that vary widely.  Therefore, the allotted planning time tailored the model.  Ultimately, 
the plan quality measures the architecture effectiveness.  In this model, the number of 
CCIRs fulfilled in the allotted planning time measured the plan quality.  The fulfillment 
of CCIRs contributes to the Commander’s confidence level in making a decision and may 
decrease planning time required to reach that threshold level.  The CCIRs fulfilled 
summary metric, therefore, is considered the critical model output variable. 
4.5 Simulation Results 
This section presents a statistical review of the model’s critical output parameter 
(%fulfilled CCIRs).  A discussion of the results for the CP and HA/DR mission threads is 
presented in Sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 respectively. 
 49 
Figure 20 shows a portion of a simulation result using the simulator available in 
CORE.  In this particular simulation of the HA/DR model, the operational activity 
M.1.2.1.2.14 (Brief Mission Analysis) is being run twice.  However, due to the random 
duration assigned to the activity it varies on every run and contributes to the overall 
Monte Carlo simulation.  Appendix H describes the durations assigned to each 
operational activity in the baseline and hypothesized architectures. 
 
Figure 20. Excerpt of an HA/DR model showing variation of events 
The team selected a 90% confidence interval and a conservative probability of 
50%.  Using the single population proportion equation, a sample size of 96.04 is required. 
Based on this value, the team elected to perform one hundred simulations per variant. 
4.5.1 Counter-Piracy Model Results 
This section presents a comparison of the CP mission thread model results for the 
baseline and hypothesized case.  Statistical validation of the comparison data shows the 
mean of the information requests fulfilled in the hypothesized architecture improves to 
48.5% over the baseline case of 41.7%.  A summary table showing the statistical results 
for the CP model architectures is given in Table 13. 
For each model variant, one hundred samples were run and summary statistics 
created for analysis.  The ―CCIR% Fulfilled‖ is calculated based on the number of CCIRs 
fulfilled against a fixed number requested. 
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Table 13. Statistics, CP, % CCIRs Fulfilled 
  Baseline Case   Hypothesized Case 












STDDEV 13.94% 9.75% 7.02%  11.38% 8.29% 6.30% 
Mean 42.6% 41.0% 41.4%   47.2% 46.5% 46.7% 
Maximum 90.0% 65.0% 65.0%   90.0% 75.0% 65.0% 
75th Percentile 50.0% 45.0% 45.0%   50.0% 50.0% 50.0% 
MEDIAN 40.0% 40.0% 40.0%   45.0% 45.0% 47.5% 
25th Percentile 30.0% 35.0% 37.5%   40.0% 40.0% 42.5% 
Minimum samples required to achieve desired 
confidence level. 
 99 37 23 
 
A data distribution plot (Box Plot) for the CP variants is given in Figure 21.  
These plots present the median value and distribution as a function of the model 
parameter time. 
A characteristic of the model results can be seen in the Box plots and the 
Histogram plots in Figure 22.  The spread of the data reduces when more time is allotted 




Figure 21. Box plots, CP.  6 hour planning time (top), 12 hour planning time (mid), 24 








































Figure 22. Histogram Plots, CP.  6 hour planning time (top), 12 hour planning time (mid), 
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4.5.2 HA/DR Model Results and Observations 
This section presents a comparison of the HA/DR mission thread model results 
for the baseline and hypothesized case.  Statistical validation of the comparison data 
shows that the mean of the information requests fulfilled in the hypothesized architecture 
improves to 48.5% over the baseline case of 41.7%.  A summary table showing the 
statistical results for the HA/DR model architectures is given in Table 14. 
For each model variant, one hundred samples were run and summary statistics 
created for analysis.  The ―CCIR% Fulfilled‖ is calculated based on the number of CCIRs 
fulfilled against a fixed number requested. 
Table 14. Statistics, HA/DR, % CCIRs Fulfilled 
 Baseline Case   Hypothesized Case  












STDDEV 14.95% 10.96% 6.13%  12.03% 8.86% 5.93% 
Mean 43.7% 42.9% 41.4%  47.8% 49.4% 48.4% 
Maximum 90.0% 75.0% 55.0%  90.0% 75.0% 62.2% 
75th Percentile 50.0% 50.0% 45.0%  60.0% 55.0% 52.5% 
MEDIAN 40.0% 40.0% 42.5%  50.0% 50.0% 47.5% 
25th Percentile 30.0% 35.0% 37.5%  40.0% 45.0% 45.0% 
Minimum samples required to achieve desired 
confidence level.  
 138 30 12 
 
Data distribution plots (Box Plots) for the HA/DR variants is given in Figure 23.  
These plots present the median value and distribution as a function of the model 
parameter time. 
A characteristic of the model results can be seen in the Box plots and the 
Histogram plots in Figure 24.  The spread of the data reduces when more time is allotted 





Figure 23. Box Plots, HA/DR.  6 hour planning time (top), 12 hour planning time (mid), 









































Figure 24. Histogram Plots, HA/DR.  6 hour planning time (top), 12 hour planning time 
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4.6 Analysis of Results 
The results of the M&S task support the overall hypothesis that some 
improvement in the commander’s situational awareness can be realized when the 
information path from remote UxS sensors is directly available at the MOC.  A 
comparison of the data sets shows subtle improvements in the critical metric of CCIRs. 
To ensure the statistically significant differences in the improvement of the 
fulfilled CCIRs metrics, unpaired, 2-sample t-test were performed.  The t-test gives the 
probability that the difference between the two means is caused by chance.  It is 
customary to say that if this probability is less than 0.05, then the difference is 
―significant‖; the difference is not caused by chance. 
 Table 15 and Table 16 present the results of the t-test matrix for the baseline and 
hypothesized case.   
Table 15. T-test Simulation Results, CP 
    
Hypothesized Case 
  6 Hour Model 12 Hour Model 24 Hour Model 
Baseline Case 6 Hour Model 0.01 -- -- 
12 Hour Model -- 2.9E-05 -- 
24 Hour Model -- -- 6.4E-08 
 
The t-test results identify a trend that shows a clear departure of the data sets as a 
function of time allotted for planning.  These results support the intuitive case where the 
MOC commander is at liberty to request additional CCIRs and thus has a very high 
probability that an improvement will be realized by the planning and MIOC teams. 
Table 16. T-test Simulation Results, HA/DR 
    
Hypothesized Case 




24 Hour Model 
Baseline Case 6 Hour Model 0.03 -- -- 
12 Hour Model -- 6.0E-06 -- 
24 Hour Model -- -- 2.3E-16 
 
However, the t-test results do not closely influence our hypothesis.  The improved 
mean of fulfilled CCIRs does.  The T-tests back up the conclusion of improvement by 
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identifying a statistical difference that is not caused by coincidence.  Because the 
improvement is moderate, it is up to the MOC commander to determine if that 
improvement is important.  Again, the statistical significance in the improvement of the 
mean % fulfilled CCIRs simply shows that the distributions are different.   
4.7 Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
The LCCE typically relates to development, production, sustainment, training, 
and disposal of a system when evaluating the TOC of a system.  For this Capstone 
project, the effort stops after recommendations and does not address materiel solutions.  
As a result, this section lays out considerations for an LCCE, but does not actually 
perform the LCCE.  This was dictated by the nature of the Capstone project architecture. 
Although an LCCE is required for many new DoD acquisitions, this Capstone 
project defers the LCC development to the next phase of the project.  The project 
architecture detailed in this project focused on the conceptual planning aspects of the 
Navy Planning Strategy and baseline for MOC planning operations to determine the 
efficiencies of operation planning process.  The hypothesized architecture CORE model 
will assess several operation missions for a non-materiel solution recommendation. 
The M&S architecture model was used to assess various configurations of the CP 
and HA/DR mission threads to determine policy type recommendations.  The non-
materiel assumptions are: 
 no R&D acquisition required for developmental efforts; 
 no procurement acquisition efforts; 
 no O&M acquisition necessary for sustainment; 
 no disposal efforts. 
The LCCE process would follow a similar analytic approach process for LCCE’s 
as described in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook and depicted in Figure 25 (Defense 
Acquistion University, Department of Defense 2010).  This LCCE process would be 
implemented for a follow-on progression phase of the planning model for MOC 
operations architecture assessed in this project.  
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Figure 25. Analytic approach for life-cycle cost estimates 
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This section addresses the last phase of the SE process whereby the analysis of the 
M&S supports the derived conclusions.  Based on the conclusions, Team A
2
 made the 
recommendations given below.  The team recognized the limited time and resources for 
this project and intentionally took a focused look at the MOC and UxS sensor data.  
Given the complexity of the problem set and the narrow focus of this project, the team 
has identified areas for additional research. 
5.1 Conclusions 
Using UAS as a game changing addition to the OLW was de-scoped to focus on 
the NPP within the MOC and MIOC components during time critical operations.  As a 
measure of effectiveness, planning time, total execution time, and information requests 
fulfilled were collected throughout the analysis to determine how the UAS sensor data 
path would affect the planning process. 
The results concluded that there is no statistical difference in planning or 
execution time with the UAS under the control of the MOC.  Based on interviews with 
stakeholders and research on the time critical planning, this result is validated as planners 
are allocated a specified time for planning – then ―work backwards.‖  The CORE model 
of the system demonstrates this and the simulation results validate that planning will 
usually take the allocated time to complete. 
An improvement in the planning process was observed in the MIOC’s ability to 
fulfill information requests.  In the modeled mission threads, the MIOC operation 
improved the mean of the information requests fulfilled to 48.5% over the baseline case 
of 41.7%. 
In the baseline architecture, there is a risk that the Blue Forces did not interpret 
the tasking properly or will only exploit the raw data to meet their own needs.  The 
exploited data sent to the MIOC may not truly meet their operational need.  If the MIOC 
has direct control of the UAS and the exploitation process, the exploited ISR data should 
be of better quality.  In addition the data should be in line with what the planning team 
requests and potentially be produced in a timely fashion. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
Our recommendation is to allow TACON over the UASs to be exercised in the 
MOC or by Blue Forces.  Because there was no statistically significant difference in the 
M&S results between the two, current doctrine and process should support either variant. 
It is up to the commanders responsible for the planning and execution to determine if the 
sensor data from a UAS would support their decision making. 
5.3 Areas for Further Study 
Based on the team’s research and analysis of the results, several areas are 
recommended for future research.  These areas are listed here: 
1. Perform network analysis to determine the infrastructure required to support raw 
data feeds. 
2. Conduct further operational analysis with a UAS under MOC and MIOC control. 
3. Conduct qualitative analysis of MOC operations during time critical planning with 
and without the UAS. 
4. Conduct qualitative analysis of the quality of plans received by Blue Forces. 
5. Perform operational analysis of Blue Forces executing plans developed with and 
without a UAS in the MOC. 
6. Determine where physical control of UAS should reside, Blue Forces or MOC. 
7. Identify requirements for a UAS to support operational planning – determine if 
any existing UAS can fulfill these requirements. 









Alpha Squared Team 
ACE Air Combat Element 
AF Air Force 
AIS Automatic Information System 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
APM(E) Assistant Program Manager for Engineering 
B2C2WG Boards, Bureaus, Centers, Cells, Working Groups 
BAMS Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 
BSLN Baseline 
C2 Command and Control 
C3F Commander Third Fleet  
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence 
C5F Commander Fifth Fleet  
C7F Commander Seventh Fleet  
CAT Crisis Action Team 
CATF Commander, Amphibious Task Force 
CCDR Combatant Commander 
CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements 
CDL Common Data Link 
CDR Commander 
CJTF Commander Joint Task Force 
CMMA Collection Management Mission Applications 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
COA Course Of Action 
COMPACOM Commander, U.S. Pacific Forces Command 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
COP Common Operational Picture 
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Acronym Definition 
COPS Current Operations 
COREsim CORE simulator 
CP Counter Piracy 
CPF Commander US Pacific Fleet 
CSG Carrier Strike Group 
CTP Common Tactical Picture 
CV Aircraft Carrier 
DCGS Distributed Common Ground System 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency 
DISN Defense Information Systems Network 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoDAF Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
DR Disaster Relief 
DS Decision Superiority 
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information 
EFFBD Enhanced Functional Flow Block Diagram 
EIS Enterprise Information Systems 
EO Electro-Optical 
ESG Expeditionary Strike Group 
ESM Electronic Support Measure 
FBM Fleet Battle Management 
FCC Fleet Command Center 
FFBD Functional Flow Block Diagram 
FFIR Friendly Forces Information Requirement 
FLT Fleet 
FMV Full Motion Video 
GALE Generic Area Limitation Environment 
GCCS-J/I
3




GCCS-M Global Command and Control System - Maritime 
HA Humanitarian Assistance 
HA/DR Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
HALE High Altitude Long Endurance 
HSI Human Systems Integration 
HYP Hypothesis 
ICOM Input Control Output Mechanisms 
ID Information Dominance 
IDEF0 Integrated Definition for Function Modeling level 0 
IER Information Exchange Requirement 
IMP Integrated Master Plan 
IMS Integrated Master Schedule 
INCOSE International Council on Systems Engineering 
IO Information Operations 
IPOE Intelligence Preparation Of The Environment 
IPR In Progress Review 
IR Infra-Red 
ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar 
ISR Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance/Information 
IT Information Technology 
IWS Integrated Warfare Systems 
JCIDS Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System 
JCS Joint Chief of Staff 
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander 
JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
JIOC Joint Intelligence Operations Center 
JIOPE Joint Intelligence Preparation Of The Environment 
JMETL Joint Mission Essential Task List 
JOA Joint Operations Area 
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Acronym Definition 
JSIPS Joint Services Imagery Processing System 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LCCE Life Cycle Cost Estimate 
LHA Amphibious Assault Ship (Landing, Helicopter, Assault) 
LOI Line Of Interface 
M&S Modeling and Simulation 
MAGTF Marine Air Ground Task Force 
MBSE Model Based Systems Engineering 
MCS Mission Control Segment 
MET Mission Essential Task 
METL Mission Essential Task List 
METOC Meteorology and Oceanography 
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit 
MIOC Maritime Intelligence Operations Center 
MOC Maritime Operations Center 
MOP Measures Of Performance 
MSSE Master of Science in Systems Engineering 
MTI Moving Target Indicator 
MTOC Mobile Tactical Operations Center 
NCA National Command Authority 
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NGOs Non Government Organizations 
NOC Network Operations Center 
NPP Naval Planning Process 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NTA Naval Tactical 
NTTP Navy Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
NWP Navy Warfare Publication 
OLW Operational Level of War 




OPCON Operational Control 
OPLAN Operational Plan 
OPNAV Chief of Naval Operations Staff 
OPORD Operations Order 
OV Operational View 
PEO Program Executive Office 
PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique 
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement 
PM Program Manager 
PMP Program Management Plan 
PMW Program Management Warfare 
PMW-120 Battlespace Awareness and Information Operations 
PMW-150 Command and Control 
PMW-160 Networks 
PMW-200 Navy Marine Corps Intranet 
PMW-210 Next Generation Network 
PMW-790 Shore and Expeditionary Integration 
POTUS President of the United States of America 
R&D Research and Development 
RCV Receive 
ROE Rule Of Engagement 
RSOC Regional Security Operations Center 
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar 
SE Systems Engineering 
SEI Specific Emitter Identification 
SHF Super High Frequency 
SIMILAR State the Problem, Investigate Alternatives, Model the System, Integrate, 
Launch the System, Assess Performance, Re-Evaluation 
SIPRNet Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
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Acronym Definition 
SITREP Situation Report 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SN Strategic National 
SPAWAR Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
ST Strategic Theater 
STF Systems Technology Forum 
SV Systems View 
TA Teaching Assistant 
Tactical 
TACON Tactical Control 
TLW Tactical Level of War 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
Tactical Operations Center 
TPM Technical Performance Metric 
TTP Tactics, Techniques, Procedures 
TX Transmit 
UAS Unmanned Aerial System 
UJTL Universal Joint Task List 
UNTL Universal Naval Task List 
US United States 
USCG United States Coast Guard 
USMC United States Marine Corps 
USS United States ship 
UXS Unmanned Systems (Air, Surface, Undersea, Ground) 
VTUAS Vertical Take-Off Unmanned Aerial System 
WAN Wide Area Network 
WARNORD Warning Order 
WGS Wideband Global Satellite Communications 
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APPENDIX B: RISK MANAGEMENT AND 
PROJECT SCHEDULE 
1 Risk Management  
The risk management process defined in the following sections was applicable to 
both the technical risks associated with the topic under study and the risks associated with 
successful completion of the Capstone project.  The Risk Manager had the responsibility 
of assessing and identifying risks of both types.  Risk items associated with the technical 
aspects of the project topic were identified as ―Technical Risk‖ and those associated with 
the project aspects were identified as ―Project Risk‖. 
The Team A
2
 Risk Management process has been adopted from the Risk 
Management Guide for DoD Acquisition (Department of Defense 2006).  As shown in 
Figure 26, there are five steps in the process:  Risk Identification, Risk Analysis, Risk 
Mitigation Planning, Risk Mitigation Plan Implementation, and Risk Tracking. 
 
Figure 26. Risk management process diagram 
1.1   Risk Identification 
Risk identification is an ongoing process that allows risks to be identified by any 
project member at any time.  As risks were identified by project members, they were 
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submitted to the Risk Manager.  The Risk Manager periodically reviewed new risks and 
assigned them to team members for analysis. 
1.2   Risk Analysis and Reporting 
All project  risk documentation was maintained in the Sakai site and included risk 
description, risk management decision, impact and likelihood of occurrence rating, plans, 
and status of those plans.   
The likelihood ratings followed the guidelines shown in Figure 27.  As shown, 
likelihood was based on the probability that the risk will occur.  Program Evaluation and 
Review Technique (PERT) was used to determine the probability of occurrence value.  
To utilize PERT, Team A
2
 members relied on experience to define three values based on 
a best guess approach: 
 Most pessimistic case (CP) 
 Most optimistic case (CO) 
 Most likely case (CL) 
The probability was then calculated using the formula 
(1) 







Figure 27. Risk likelihood criteria 
The consequence ratings followed the guidelines shown in Figure 28.  For this 
project, there was no associated cost.  Thus, consequence was based purely on impact to 
the schedule and ability to meet project milestones. 
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Figure 28. Risk consequence criteria 
To report risks, the likelihood and consequence for each risk was added to a graph 
similar to the one shown in Figure 29.  This graph clearly shows the total risk value for 




Figure 29. Risk analysis and reporting 
1.3   Risk Mitigation Planning and Implementation 
Once risks were identified and analyzed, the Risk Manager assessed whether to 
watch, mitigate, or transfer them.  If risks were watched or mitigated, contingency plans 
were developed.  Additionally, if the risk was to be mitigated, it was assigned to a Team 
A
2
 member.  The team member was responsible for developing mitigation steps, then 
approved by the team, and executed as required. 
1.4   Risk Tracking 
Risk reviews were scheduled as a standing agenda item at Team A
2
 meetings.  
During this scheduled review, the status of any mitigation or contingency plans was 
discussed. 
1.5   Integrated Master Schedule 
An initial representation of the Capstone project IMS is shown in Figure 30, with 
labeling to indicate important information areas. 
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Figure 30. Capstone Project IMS 
1.6   Critical Path Method 
The critical path method is a ―technique that aids understanding of the 
dependency of events in a project and the time required to complete them.  Activities 
which, when delayed, have an impact on the total project schedule are critical and said to 
be on the critical path‖ [Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 2001].  The Gantt chart, Figure 
30 above, represents the critical tasks and subtasks of this project.  They were scheduled 
to occur in the following order:  PMP, IPR 1, Problem Refinement, Value System 
Design, Model Alternatives, IPR 2, Analysis of Alternatives, Final Recommendation, and 
Final Presentation.  However, task and process overlapping was planned to ensure 
schedule efficiencies. 
Timely, efficient management and completion of each individual task and subtask 
was paramount to overall project success.  The most critical task of the project was 
anticipated to be Model Alternatives due to its perceived complexity and it being the 
longest individual task requiring careful management of time and resources.  Four 
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additional subtasks further refined the project’s critical path:  Functional Analysis; Value 
Hierarchy; Alternative Generation Process; and Performance Modeling and Simulation.  
All four subtasks were significant to qualifying and quantifying project findings. 
Team A
2
 researched areas for Problem Refinement.  Detailed analyses provided 
the Value System Design effort with the data needed to establish the necessary input 
metrics for the Alternatives Generation process.  To successfully Model Alternatives, it 
was imperative to permit modelers the maximum amount of time to identify, choose, and 
gain the requisite experience to afford well-organized modeling activities.  Time was 
given to evaluate models for use in this project to offer the highest quality output data 
sets.  Modeling and simulation results set the stage for the derivation of Feasible 
Alternative data and presenting opportunities supportive to Analysis of Alternatives.  
Ultimately, these results determined the priority of alternatives leading to the 





























APPENDIX C: COUNTER-PIRACY MISSION 
THREAD 
1 Counter-Piracy Mission Thread Scenario Description 
Although a mission thread for a CP scenario has two notional components – 1) 
routine and specialized monitoring of the assigned area of operations to be proactive in 
deterring piracy, and 2) a response to a piracy event – only component 2 was addressed in 
the Capstone project for the analysis and recommendations.  This mission thread is 
notional and covers the full range of activities associated with such an event, but the 
Capstone project only addressed those activities directly related to the MOC at the OLW 
for the value added (force multiplier) of time-sensitive UAS to the operations planning 
process and NPP. 
1.1   Component 2 Strategic and Operational Context 
A United States of America (U.S.) vessel with U.S. citizens was intercepted and 
captured by pirates in the Malacca Strait.  The President of the U.S. (POTUS) – through 
the National Command Authority (NCA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Commander, U.S. 
Pacific Forces Command (COMPACOM), and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet (CPF) – 
directed Commander, Seventh Fleet (C7F) to assist Law Enforcement to locate and bring 
the pirates to account.  C7F was further designated as Commander, Joint Task Force 
(CJTF), Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC), and Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) to execute this mission.  The MOC role in this 
scenario was the operational planning and execution of tasking tactical assets to employ 
integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create the effects necessary to achieve 
assigned mission objectives.  The operational mission was to deter piracy in the Malacca 
Strait. 
Many external intelligence agencies were required to support the execution of the 
mission; but for simplicity to the model were collectively called Blue Forces.  Each exists 
for highly specialized collection and analysis of information collected from the vast array 
of sensors to support various operational needs in the national security of the U.S.. 
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Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) was embarked on LHA 6 – U.S. 
Ship (USS) America – located in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) in the littorals off the 
coasts of Malaysia and Singapore.  Pirates have taken a U.S. vessel with U.S. citizens 
captive in this area.  LHA 6 was used to provide military support to recover the U.S. 
vessel and citizens, and deter further piracy in the JOA.  LHA 6 conducted Expeditionary 
Warfare activities and coordinated plans and tasking with Law Enforcement, other 
components, and supporting organizations.  The MOC coordinated efforts of LHA 6 and 
both Singaporean and Malaysian forces in this Combined effort.  A specific Marine Air 
Ground Task Force (MAGTF), called a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), was 
embarked on LHA 6; the MEU Air Combat Element (ACE) contained the Fire Scout 
UAS to work with the ScanEagle. 
C7F was assigned UAS assets – RQ-4A/Global Hawk, MQ-4C/BAMS (Broad 
Area Maritime Surveillance) UAS, MQ-8/Fire Scout, and ScanEagle – to be employed in 
the mission.  The Global Hawk and BAMS UAS operated from land basing, and Fire 
Scout and ScanEagle operatef off LHA 6.  C7F executed his authority through the MOC 
and exercised Operational Control (OPCON) of all assets assigned.  Tactical Control 
(TACON) was delegated to respective Tactical Commanders. 
1.2   Mission Thread related to “Baseline” and “Hypothesis” Case 
Model 
Figure 31 represents the notional Operational View (OV) 1 architecture for 
BAMS and Global Hawk – high altitude long endurance (HALE) UAS – that provided 
persistent surveillance.  Baseline case architecture reflected general tasking through the 
Mission Control Segment (MCS) as well as processing and exploitation through the same 
node.  The hypothesized case architecture explored specific tasking through the MCS, but 
delivered post-processed data to the MIOC for exploitation and analysis.  Acronyms from 
the figure are located in Appendix A. 
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Figure 31. Operational view of the BAMS UAS 
Figure 32 represents a different OV-1 perspective combined with an additional 
Systems View (SV) 2 representation of a high level systems interface.  Acronyms from 
this figure can be located in Appendix A.
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Figure 32. UxS Interoperability Thread View BAMS to Shore Thread 
Figure 33 represents the notional OV-1 architecture for Fire Scout and ScanEagle 
– tactical UAS – that provided rapid response to mission requirements.  Baseline case 
architecture reflected general tasking through the LHA-6 ACE as well as processing and 
exploitation through the embarked MEU intelligence assets.  The hypothesized case 
architecture explored specific tasking through the ACE, but delivered post-processed data 




Figure 33. Operational View Fire Scout 
Figure 34 represents a different OV-1 perspective combined with an additional 
Systems View (SV) 2 representation of a high level systems interface.  Acronyms for this 
figure can be located in Appendix A. 
For the baseline case and hypothesized case models, the architectures were 
simplified while maintaining the operational activities involved.  The model reflected the 
following operational activities.  The first review by intelligence analysts determined 
what information was available locally, and what information was available from 
reachback databases.  The analysts retrieved locally available data and initiated requests 
for information not locally available.  Any information not locally or remotely available 
was passed to the collections cell to obtain the information.  The collections cell:  
 determined the actual observable aspects of each requirement; 
 determined which intelligence disciplines could provide relevant responses; 
 assessed available assets that had sensors to satisfy the requirement; 
 mapped the platform and sensors to the requirements for collection tasking;  
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  assigned exploitation assets against the collected data for delivery in a form for 
the analysts to fuse and analyze all available information in a continuous cycle 
until the requirement was satisfied or the relevant timeline passed. 
 
Figure 34. Operational / Systems View 2 Fire Scout 
The MOC scope of the scenario focused on the interoperability (end-to-end) 
between the JFMCC, BAMS/Global Hawk, ACE elements and the benefits of time-
sensitive UAS collection to support the OLW.  The scenario demonstrated a plausible 
series of information exchange requirements (IERs) that illustrated UAS capabilities to 
achieve battlespace awareness support to operational decisions.  Communications 
systems provided the MOC time-sensitive information and the capability to maintain 
situational awareness to achieve mission goals and objectives. 
The key tailored MOC nodes in this scenario focused around the MIOC and Fleet 
Command Center (FCC).  After the mission was received via the chain of command, the 
Commander issues the Commander’s Intent.  Operations developed courses of action 
(COAs), while Intelligence set out the threat and addressed characterization of the 
battlespace.  Based on the approved COA and gaps in knowledge of the threat or 
battlespace characterization, prioritized information requirements were issued for 
resolution by the MIOC.  Notional operational requirements are contained in Section 
3.1.2. 
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APPENDIX D: HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE 
/DISASTER RELIEF MISSION THREAD 
1 HA/DR Mission Thread Scenario Description 
A mission thread for an HA/DR scenario relates to the most recent Navy mission.  
The importance of Naval power has been that 90% of the earth’s surface can be reached 
from Naval Forces.  The ability of the Navy to reach trouble spots quickly and provide 
sustained operations is its hallmark.  Like the CP mission thread, this mission thread is 
notional and covers the full range of activities associated with such an event, but the 
Capstone project only addressed those activities directly related to the MOC at the OLW 
for the value added (force multiplier) of time-sensitive UAS to the operations planning 
process and NPP. 
1.1   Component 2 Strategic and Operational Context 
The Philippines was devastated by a typhoon that destroyed most public services 
on Luzon Island and the government asked for international help.  POTUS – through 
NCA, JCS, COMPACOM, and CPF – directed C7F to send Naval forces to The 
Philippines and provide HA/DR.  C7F was further designated CJTF, JFMCC, and JFACC 
to execute this mission.  The MOC role in this scenario was the operational planning and 
execution of tasking tactical assets to create the effects necessary to achieve assigned 
mission objectives.  The operational mission was to restore basic services on Luzon 
pending host nation ability to sustain itself. 
Many external intelligence agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs) 
were required to support the execution of the mission; but for simplicity to the model 
were collectively called Blue Forces.  Each exists for highly specialized collection and 
analysis of information collected from the vast array of sensors to support various 
operational needs in the national security of the U.S.  
As in the CP mission thread, LHA 6 was operating in the JOA.  The power, 
potable water capacity, food stores, and medical services provide needed relief pending 
restoration of host nation services.  Again, this mission thread addressed a full range of 
activities associated with such an event, but the Capstone project only addressed those 
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activities directly related to the MOC at the OLW for the value added (force multiplier) 
of time-sensitive information to the operational planning process. 
For this scenario, emphasis was on information required to support operational 
decisions related to:  allocation of forces, actions required, rules of engagement (civil 
unrest), maintaining situational awareness, potential political implications or side effects, 
and likelihood of armed opposition to HA/DR. 
1.2   Mission Thread related to “Baseline” and “Hypothesis” Case 
Model 
See Appendix C for assigned UAS assets and architectural representations.  
Although the case models were essentially the same, timelines varied somewhat with this 
mission thread as assets began immediate preparations for support in anticipation of 
tasking.  Operational requirements are addressed in Section 3.1.2. 
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APPENDIX E: KEY TERMS 
During the early stages of this Capstone project, the team formed a common 
understanding of certain key concepts and terms related to the problem statement.  To 
obtain that basic level of commonality, a fundamental set of definitions was researched 
and agreed upon.  The following definitions are those that the team considered most 
important to obtain a common understanding of the problem.  It is highly recommended 
that the reader become familiar with these terms. 
1 Fleet Battle Management 
As described in the Navy Information Dominance Roadmap Description (Chief of 
Naval Operations 2009), FBM is the capability to leverage information dominance and 
decision superiority to enhance capability to adaptively command, direct and guide from 
whatever physical or virtual location best supports effective C2 to meet commander’s 
intent and respond to changes in the operating environment.  It encompasses the 
following concepts: 
 Develop a mission-centric C2 model for virtual multi-theater mission execution 
and highly-automated dynamic operation of the Fleet 
 Deliver a concept to outpace and disrupt adversary battle management capability. 
 Advance capability to command and operate the Fleet as a dynamically netted, 
integrated and adapted entity at the operational and strategic levels of warfare, 
globally 
 Define the processes and architecture that enables optimal management of Navy 
activities within an operational environment expanded to better account for 
operation in information and cyberspace domains  
2 Maritime Operations Center (MOC) 
MOCs are the Navy’s Operational Level Warfare C2 organizations.  The MOC 
initiative delivers global maritime capabilities throughout the full range of military 
operations.  Critical enablers of the Maritime Strategy, MOCs provide commanders with 
people and processes enabled by common, interoperable, networked systems to enhance 
global maritime capabilities. 
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3 Operational Level of War 
As described in the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms (Department of Defense 
2010), the operational level of war is the level of war at which campaigns and major 
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives 
within Theaters or Areas of Operations.  Activities at this level link tactics and strategy 
by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, 
sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying 
resources to bring about and sustain these events.  These activities imply a broader 
dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative 
support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are 
exploited to achieve strategic objectives. 
4 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance   
As described in the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms(Department of Defense 
2010), ISR is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of 
sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support 
of current and future operations.  This is an integrated intelligence and operations 
function. 
5 Unmanned Aerial System   
As described in the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms(Department of Defense 
2010), an Unmanned Aerial System is one whose components include the necessary 
equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft.  A system such as 
this is also referred to as an UAS. 
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APPENDIX F: PLANNING PROCESS 
As described in Maritime Component Commander Guidebook, the Operations 
Process consists of four activities: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess.  These activities 
typically occur simultaneously with planning and preparation activities being 
continuously performed (Naval War College 2010, 1-1).  At each step of the Operations 
Process, the Commander makes decisions following the Commander’s Decision Cycle as 
shown in Figure 35.  As explained in NWP 3-32, ―The commander’s decision cycle 
provides a mechanism for focusing the operational staff to support critical decisions and 
actions as the operational commander controls campaign/major OPLAN preparation and 
execution‖ (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2008, 6-8).  
These decisions are directly influenced by the ability to gather accurate and timely 
information.  The Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) shows that the battle rhythm is established to guide the staff 
through the steps of the Operations Process by providing structure to the flow of 
information and coordinating staff interaction(US Fleet Forces Command 2007, 2-33). 
 
Figure 35. Illustration of the basic Commander’s decision cycle elements 
1 Navy Planning Process (NPP) 
Although Team A
2
 reviewed the entire Operations Process, research led to the 
concept that the key to optimizing sensor effect in the MOC is through the NPP.  The 
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NPP is a separate process that falls within the larger Operations Process and contributes 
to the Commander’s decision cycle by providing a set of procedures that can be used as a 
decision making tool as shown in Figure 36.  Given this, the project focused on activities 
associated with the NPP.  NWP 3-32 describes that plans made using the NPP can be 
placed into two categories: Contingency (non-time sensitive) or Crisis Action (time 
sensitive) (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2008, 5-16).  
Both categories follow the same steps, but are performed by different groups within the 
MOC with different levels of time constraint. 
 
Figure 36. The cycle of the Navy Planning Process  
Further research revealed that response to near term events falls within the 
execution step of the Operational Process.  Near-term events are considered part of 
current operations and typically require response within forty-eight hours as defined in 
the Maritime Component Commander Guidebook (Naval War College 2010, 1-2).  At 
this stage, the Operations Process can be simplified to a shortened version of the 
Commander’s Decision Cycle, as shown in Figure 37.  This type of planning is 
considered Crisis Action and is performed by a Crisis Action Team (CAT).  The CATs 
follow the NPP, but may abbreviate some of the steps due to time constraints (Naval War 
College 2010, 4-10).  
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Figure 37. Elements of the Commander’s decision cycle during execution  
The NPP consists of six steps.  Navy Planning, NWP 5-01 states  that the steps are 
designed to optimize the commander’s and staff’s ability to analyze operational 
environments, distill information, link force employment to objectives, integrate with 
joint forces, and adhere to doctrine while making decisions to effectively plan and 
execute missions (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2007, 1-3). 
1.1   Initiation 
Prior to the first step of the NPP is an initiation step.  NWP 3-32 shows that this 
step is linked to the ―Direct‖ step of the Commander’s decision cycle and is initiated 
when a mission order is received from higher headquarters (Department of the Navy, 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2008, 6-15).  During this step, the CAT or 
Operational Planning Team is formed.  The Commander provides the planning team with 
initial guidance that includes, but is not limited to: issues, limits, time constraints, 
commander’s initial intent, CCIRs, purpose, objectives, and command relationships.  
1.2   Mission Analysis 
Mission analysis is the first step of the NPP and the beginning of the Assessment 
process in the Commander’s decision cycle.  Mission Analysis drives the entire planning 
process by providing an overall assessment of the situation (Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations 2007).  The overall process followed is shown in Figure 38 (Naval War 
College 2010, 2-8).   
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Figure 38. Detailed decomposition of mission analysis 
Mission analysis depends on the ability of the planning team to obtain required 
information.  The IPOE is one of the critical sources of this information.  Navy Warfare 
Planning Document 5-01 (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2007, Glossary-7) 
defines Joint IPOE as: ―The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to 
produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of 
the joint force commander’s decision making process. It is a continuous process that 
includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational 
environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary 
potential courses of action‖.   
The planning team influences the collection activities of the intelligence 
organizations through CCIRs.  The CCIRs are passed to the MIOC which resides in the 
MOC and acts as a bridge to the wider intelligence community.  During mission analysis, 
the MIOC acts on the initial CCIRs that were created during initiation and begins to act 
on new CCIRs as they are developed by the planning team.  The timeline to respond to 
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CCIRs can be extremely short during Crisis Action planning.  In this event, the 
Commander must make a decision to either conclude mission analysis with the limited 
information available or to delay the process.  As described in Section 4, providing a 
direct path for the MIOC to gather information through UAS control can directly impact 
the mission analysis step with game changing results.  Due to the importance of timely 
and accurate information at this stage of planning, it is assumed that this step will have 
the most benefits from changes to UAS control.  Although the following steps of the 
planning process also include tasks to collect and analyze information, the biggest impact 
occurs during Mission Analysis. 
The final step in the mission analysis step is the Mission Analysis briefing which 
serves as a decision briefing for the Commander.  The planning team presents the 
proposed Mission Statement, Revised Commander’s Intent, Commander’s Planning 
Guidance, and future operation WARNORDs (Naval War College 2010, 2-9).  
WARNORDs provide direction to subordinates and serve as a notice of future required 
action. 
1.3   Course of Action Development 
Based on the output of mission analysis, the planning team develops multiple 
COAs.  The COAs provide options to accomplish the mission and include associated 
risks.  During this development, the planning team continues to monitor the updated 
IPOE to gain the latest intelligence information available.  Additional CCIRs may be 
generated to support COA development (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2007, 
3-2). 
1.4   Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming) 
Once the Commander has approved the developed COAs, the planning team 
conducts a comparison analysis through wargaming to determine the most suitable COA.  
Wargaming involves the staff stepping through a series of action/reaction/counteraction 
sequences (Naval War College 2010, 2-15).   
1.5   Course of Action Comparison and Decision 
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Each COA is scored based on the wargaming results.  This scoring process allows 
the Commander to choose the COA with the greatest potential to successfully complete 
the mission (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2007, 5-2). 
1.6   Plans and Orders Development 
Once the COA has been selected, supporting plans and orders must be developed.   
The planning team takes the COA CONOPS and translates it to either operational plans 
(OPLANS) or operational orders (OPORDS) (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
2007, 6-5). 
1.7   Transition 
The final step involves transitioning the OPLANS and OPORDS to the units 
responsible for execution. 
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APPENDIX G: KEY OPERATIONAL NODES 
This appendix describes the key operational nodes that were identified and added 
to the Vitech CORE Model.  Each of these nodes performs an activity that was directly 
affected by changes to sensor control and data collection. 
1 MOC 
The MOC is the highest level operational node for the planning process.  The 
definition of the MOC as stated in the Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations 
Center Concept of Operations (CONOPS ) is: ―To provide maritime capabilities in 
support of the CCDR and joint force CDR, the mission of the MOC is to assess, plan, and 
execute maritime operations at the operational level of war across the range of military 
options‖ (US Fleet Forces Command 2007, 2-6).  To model the planning process it was 
necessary to identify the operational nodes that compose the MOC and their associated 
activities in the context of the mission thread.  The structure of the MOC is shown in 
Figure 39.  The MOC node descriptions were obtained from Maritime Operations Center 
NTTP 3-32.1 (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 2008). 
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Figure 39. Elements of MOC organization and processes 
1.1    MOC Commander 
The MOC Commander is responsible for directing all planning activities within 
the MOC.  The Commander drives the planning process and holds decision authority at 
each step.   
1.2   Current Operations (COPS) 
COPS is a working group within the MOC that is responsible for ongoing 
operations or operations that typically occur within 48 hours.  COPS also performs short 
term planning through the formation of a CAT. 
1.3   Crisis Action Team 
A CAT is a temporary working group within the MOC that is formed by the MOC 
Commander to perform planning for near term events that typically must occur within 48 
hours of receiving a mission.  Similar to the other planning groups in the MOC, the CAT 
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follows the NPP but has the ability to abbreviate steps as necessary (Naval War College 
2010, 4-10).  The CAT presents planning options to the MOC Commander at each step of 
the NPP.  
1.4   Maritime Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) 
The MIOC is a working group within the MOC that performs all intelligence 
activities and provides situational awareness.  During planning, the MIOC receives 
information requests from the MOC Commander and CAT.  The MIOC fulfils those 
information requests directly or through interaction with external groups. 
1.5   Intelligence Plans Staff 
The intelligence plans staff is a subgroup within the MIOC that provides the link 
between the MIOC and planning process (Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations 2008, 3-4).  The intelligence plans staff prioritizes information 
requirements and creates collection plans to obtain missing information. 
1.6   Other MOC Groups 
There are several other groups within the MOC that interact with the CAT during 
the planning process.  However, these interactions are not directly affected by changes to 
UAS information flow.   They have been included in the CORE model, but are not 
associated with any operational activities used during the simulations of the selected 
mission threads. 
 
2 External Nodes 
Raymond Held, provided the definitions for the external nodes (Held 2010). 
2.1   JFMCC 
The JFMCC is the higher headquarters for the MOC and provides guidance on 
required missions and activities. 
2.2   Intelligence Community 
The intelligence community comprises all intelligence groups outside of the 
MIOC.  Although this community consists of numerous separate groups, for the purpose 
of modeling this particular problem it was sufficient to consider them as one external 
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node.  The intelligence community provides one mechanism for the MIOC to request and 
receive intelligence information.   
2.3   Blue Forces 
For the purposes of this model, Blue Forces was the node that collects data and 
executes missions.  Similar to the Intelligence Community, Blue Forces consists of 
numerous separate groups; but was modeled as a single external node. 
2.4   Sensor/platform operator 
The sensor/platform operator is the one group within Blue Forces that was defined 
separately.  The activities performed by this subgroup are integral to modeling data 
collection options. 
2.5   Red Forces 
The composition of the Red Forces changes depending on the mission thread.  In 
all cases, the activities of the Red Forces initiate the planning process.  Blue forces create 
a SITREP in response to Red Force actions.  The SITREP leads to higher headquarters 
providing a mission to the MOC.  There are several steps between the issuance of a 
SITREP and issuance of a MOC mission, but these steps were not affected by the 
proposed UAS changes.  Therefore, these steps were omitted from the model. 
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APPENDIX H: OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES 
NOMINAL TIME AND DISTRIBUTION 
ALLOCATION 
This section includes a brief description of each operational activity with respect 
to its function and time allocation for the CP mission thread.  Each activity was given an 
hierarchical designation M.X.X.X. denoting its level of abstraction in the model.  The 
first section reflects the allocation for the baseline architecture and the second section for 
the hypothesized architecture. 
Time distributions for operational activities in COREsim are determined four 
different ways: 
1. Constant duration 
2. Random distribution 
3. COREscript execution 
4. Execution of subordinate activities 
The model relied mostly on activities with normal random distributions (with 
defined means and standard deviations), constant durations, and execution of subordinate 
activities.  Table 17 lists the time distributions that were defined in the model for the 
baseline architecture and used to generate the simulation results in Section 4.5. 
 96 
Table 17. Baseline Architecture Time Distributions 




M.1 Respond to Piracy Event Subordinate - - 
M.1.1 Generate Mission Normal 15 7 
M.1.2 Perform MOC Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1 Perform Operational Planning Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.1 Initiate Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.1.1 Form Crisis Action Team Constant 10 - 
M.1.2.1.1.2 Analyze Commander Intent & Guidance 
(Determine Initial Guidance) 
Normal 16.5 5 
M.1.2.1.2 Perform Navy Planning Process Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.2.1 Analyze Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.2.1.1 Conduct Operational Analysis Normal 15 5 
M.1.2.1.2.1.2 Determine Recommended CCIRs (Develop 
Mission Analysis CCIRs) 
Constant 30 - 
M.1.2.1.2.1.3 Update Commander’s intent for Mission 
Analysis 
Constant 5 - 
M.1.2.1.2.1.4 Brief Mission Analysis Normal 15 5 
M.1.2.1.2.1.5 Prepare Plans / Orders (Issue WARNORDs) Normal 20 5 
M.1.2.1.2.1.6 Issue Approval to begin COA development Constant 0 - 
M.1.2.1.2.2 Develop COAs Normal 20  5 
M.1.2.1.2.3 Analyze COAs Normal 12 3 
M.1.2.1.2.4 COA Comparison and Decision Normal 15 4 
M.1.2.1.2.5 Prepare Plans / Orders (Develop Plans and 
Orders) 
Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.1.2.6 Commander Rejects Plans Constant 0 - 
M.1.2.1.2.7 Transition Subordinate - - 
M1.2.1.2.7.1 Brief Mission Plan Normal 20 5 
M.1.2.2. Perform MIOC Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.2.1 Process CCIR Constant 1 - 
M.1.2.2.2 Plan collection Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.3 Request Sensor Data Constant 1 - 
M.1.2.2.4 Receive ISR Data Normal 10 5 
M.1.2.2.5 Retrieve Internal ISR Data Normal 1 1 
M.1.2.2.6 Retrieve External ISR Data Normal 5 1 
M.1.2.2.7 Fuse ISR Data Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.8 Analyze Fused ISR Data Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.9 Create “Intelligence Preparation of the 
Environment” 
Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.10 Finish MIOC Mission Constant 1 - 
M.1.3 Perform Blue Forces Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.3.1 Fulfill Collection Task Subordinate - - 
M.1.3.1.1 Process Task Messages Normal 3 1 
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M.1.3.1.2 Control Platform Normal 40 10 
M.1.3.1.3 Collect ISR Data Normal 40 10 
M.1.3.1.4 Process ISR Data Normal 2 1 
M.1.3.1.5 Exploit ISR Data Normal 20 5 
M.1.3.1.6 Finish ISR Collection Constant 1 - 
M.1.3.2 Execute Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.3.2.1 Preplan for Mission Normal 45 10 
M.1.3.2.2 Plan for Mission Normal 60 10 
M.1.3.2.3 Issue Tasking Normal 10 1 
M.1.3.2.4 Execute Tasking Normal 60 20 
R.1 Perform Piracy Event Constant 0 - 
M.2 Provide Humanitarian Aid Subordinate - - 
R.2 Perform Act of God Constant 0 - 
 
Table 18 lists the time distributions that were defined in the model for the 
hypothesized architecture and used to generate the simulation results in Section 4.5 
Table 18. Hypothesized Architecture Time Distributions 




M.1 Respond to Piracy Event Subordinate - - 
M.1.1 Generate Mission Normal 15 7 
M.1.2 Perform MOC Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1 Perform Operational Planning Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.1 Initiate Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.1.1 Form Crisis Action Team Constant 10 - 
M.1.2.1.1.2 Analyze Commander Intent & Guidance 
(Determine Initial Guidance) 
Normal 16.5 5 
M.1.2.1.2 Perform Navy Planning Process Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.2.1 Analyze Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.1.2.1.1 Conduct Operational Analysis Normal 15 5 
M.1.2.1.2.1.2 Determine Recommended CCIRs (Develop 
Mission Analysis CCIRs) 
Constant 30 - 
M.1.2.1.2.1.3 Update Commander’s intent for Mission 
Analysis 
Constant 5 - 
M.1.2.1.2.1.4 Brief Mission Analysis Normal 15 5 
M.1.2.1.2.1.5 Prepare Plans / Orders (Issue WARNORDs) Normal 20 5 
M.1.2.1.2.1.6 Issue Approval to begin COA development Constant 0 - 
M.1.2.1.2.2 Develop COAs Normal 20  5 
M.1.2.1.2.3 Analyze COAs Normal 12 3 
M.1.2.1.2.4 COA Comparison and Decision Normal 15 4 
M.1.2.1.2.5 Prepare Plans / Orders (Develop Plans and 
Orders) 
Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.1.2.6 Commander Rejects Plans Constant 0 - 
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M.1.2.1.2.7 Transition Subordinate - - 
M1.2.1.2.7.1 Brief Mission Plan Normal 20 5 
M.1.2.2. Perform MIOC Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.2.2.1 Process CCIR Constant 1 - 
M.1.2.2.2 Plan Collection Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.3 Request Sensor Data Constant 1 - 
M.1.2.2.3.1 Task Sensor Normal 5 1 
M.1.2.2.3.2 Task Platform Normal 5 1 
M.1.2.2.3.3 Control Platform Normal 30 5 
M.1.2.2.3.4 Collect ISR Data Normal 30 5 
M.1.2.2.3.5 Process ISR Data Normal 2 1 
M.1.2.2.3.6 Exploit ISR Data Normal 20 5 
M.1.2.2.4 Receive ISR Data Normal 10 5 
M.1.2.2.5 Retrieve Internal ISR Data Normal 1 1 
M.1.2.2.6 Retrieve External ISR Data Normal 5 1 
M.1.2.2.7 Fuse ISR Data Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.8 Analyze Fused ISR Data Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.9 Create “Intelligence Preparation of the 
Environment” 
Normal 10 1 
M.1.2.2.10 Finish MIOC Mission Constant 1 - 
M.1.3 Perform Blue Forces Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.3.1 Execute Mission Subordinate - - 
M.1.3.1.1 Preplan for Mission Normal 45 10 
M.1.3.1.2 Plan for Mission Normal 60 10 
M.1.3.1.3 Issue Tasking Normal 10 1 
M.1.3.1.4 Execute Tasking Normal 60 20 
R.1 Perform Piracy Event Constant 0 - 
M.2 Provide Humanitarian Aid Subordinate - - 
R.2 Perform Act of God Constant 0 - 
 99 
REFERENCES 
Cartwood, Adrian J. Riding the profitability curve. 11 18, 2010. 
http://7million7years.com/2010/08/04/riding-the-profitability-curve-asset/ (accessed 
11 18, 2010). 
Chief of Naval Operations. "Information Dominance, A Vision for the U.S. Navy." CNO, 
December 18, 2009. 
Defense Acquistion University, Department of Defense. "Defense Acquistion 
Guidebook." Defense Acquistion University. August 11, 2010. guidebook@dau.mil 
(accessed November 10, 1020). 
Department of Defense. DOD Architecture Framework Version 1.5, Volume II Product 
Descriptions. Guidance Publication, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 
2007. 
—. "DoD Dictionary of Military Terms." April 2010. 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary (accessed September 12, 2010). 
—. "Risk Management Guide for DoD Acquisition, Sixth Edition." Defense Acquisition 
University. August 2006. http://www.dau.mil/pubscats/PubsCats/RMG 6Ed 
Aug06.pdf (accessed February 22, 2010). 
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. "Maritime Operations 




August 25, 2010). 
—. "Maritime Operations Center NTTP 3-32.1." Navy Doctrine Library System. October 
2008. https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/pdf_id/255164/3-32-
1_%28Oct_2008%29_thru_Chg_2_%28NTTP%29.pdf#search=%22Maritime%20
Operations%20Center%22 (accessed August 25, 2010). 
Department of the Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard. "Implementing the 
Maritime Strategy." Navy.mil. 2010. 
http://www.navy.mil/maritime/noc/NOC2010.pdf (accessed November 12, 2010). 
 100 
Dorsett, David J. "The U.S. Navy's Vision for Information Dominance." Department of 
the Navy, May 2010. 
Gorman, Dave, interview by A2 Capstone Team. CGI Support to PMW-150 (C2) and 
PMW-790 (MOC) (November 9, 2010). 
Held, Raymond, interview by A2 Team. Technical Authority and Chief Systems Engineer 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance/Information Operations 
(Meteorology and Oceanography, Cyberspace, Space) Space and Naval Warfare 
Systems Command (October 20, 2010). 
Joint Staff. "Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) Database With Conditions." Washington, 
D.C., February 20, 2009. 
Minor, Ira L., interview by Team A2. Assistant Program Manager (Engineering), PMW 
790 MOC Integration Project (October 8, 2010). 
Naval War College. "Maritime Component Commander Guidebook." Navy Doctrine 
Library System. February 2010. 
https://ndls.nwdc.navy.mil/pdf_id/242882/MCC_Guidebook_FEB_2010.pdf#search
=%22maritime%20component%20commander%20guidebook%22 (accessed 
October 12, 2010). 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. "Maritime Operations Center (MOC) Systems 
Baseline." Washington, D.C.: OPNAV, September 30, 2010. 
—. "Navy Planning, NWP 5-01." United States Navy, January 2007. 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. Standardized Maritime Operations Center 
(MOC) Architecture Recommendation for POM-12. Technical Document, San 
Diego, CA: Department of Defense, 2009. 
The United Kingdom Hydrographic Office. "Anti-Piracy Planning Chart." The United 
Kingdom Hydrographic Office. September 16, 2010. 
http://www.ukho.gov.uk/media/news/pages/antipiracychart.aspx (accessed 
November 14, 2010). 
US Fleet Forces Command. "Maritime Headquarters with Maritime Operations Center 
Concept of Operations (CONOPS)." Norfolk: U.S. Department of the Navy, March 
13, 2007. 
 101 
Vitech. "CORE 6 Architecture Definition Guide (DoDAF v1.5)." Vitech. November 
2009. http://www.vitechcorp.com/support/documentationarchive.html (accessed 
October 18, 2010). 
Ziegler, Mike, interview by Ira Minor. Chief Technology Officer, STF Corporation 




























INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
3. Dr. Donald Muehlbach 
Naval Postgraduate School 
San Diego, California  
4. Dr. Weilian Su 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
5. Dr. Bill Solitario 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
6. Dr. Bill Rix 
SPAWARSYSCOM 
4301 Pacific Hwy 
San Diego, California, 92110  
 
 
